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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN THE 
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT 
INDUSTRY 
Allison Dabbs Garrett and Robert Garis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Health care costs rose rapidly over the past several years1 and are 
expected to continue to grow significantly in the future.2  Prescription 
drug prices are one of the largest components of this increase, with 
spending on prescription drugs more than quadrupling since 1990.3  
According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, increases in 
prescription drug prices accounted for 16.7% of the total increase in 
health care spending in 2001.4  Legislators, health care professionals, 
insurance groups, and consumer groups have been engaged for many 
years in a quixotic debate over the health care crisis.  
                                                 
* Allison Garrett is the Vice President for Academic Affairs at Oklahoma Christian 
University and was previously Vice President of Benefits Compliance and Planning at Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.  Robert Garis is an Associate Professor of Pharmacy at the Creighton 
University School of Pharmacy and he has studied PBMs for several years.  The authors 
wish to thank Robert Farmer, a research librarian at Faulkner University’s law school, for 
his able assistance. 
1 See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health 
Statistics Group, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t2.asp (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2005).  In 2000, overall healthcare costs rose by 7.2%, while prescription costs rose 
by 16.4%; in 2001 overall costs rose 8.9%, while prescription costs rose 15.9%; in 2002 the 
numbers were 14.9% and 9.3%; and in 2003 the numbers were 7.7% and 10.7%, respectively.  
Id.; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1 (2005). 
2 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, COMPARING PROJECTED GROWTH IN HEALTH CARE 
EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMY 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/ 
chcm050206oth2.cfm.  Health care spending is currently increasing about 2.5% faster than 
the growth of the gross domestic product.  Id. 
3 See PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Improving Health Care: A 
Dose of Competition, at 3 (July 2004), www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt. 
Pdf; see also Prescription Drugs: Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures and Coverage at 
1 (2004), http://ebri.new.matrixgroup.net/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibPrint&content 
_id=493. 
4 But see Prescription Drugs, supra note 3, at 1.  (noting that the growth rate may be 
slowing somewhat); Bruce Shutan, Prime Time for PBMs, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Feb. 
2004, http://www.benefitnews.com/detail.cfm?id=5550&terms=%7Car%7C (“Although 
employers are expected to face another year of double-digit health plan increases in the 
12% to 15% range, they’re gradually reining in prescription drug costs. The pharmacy trend 
rate fell to 15.3% from 17.7% between the spring and fall alone, according to Aon’s recently 
published twice-annual Health Care Trends Survey”). 
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One industry largely overlooked in the healthcare debate is 
pharmacy benefit management.  Pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) 
originated during the 1970s to serve as fiscal intermediaries by 
adjudicating prescription drug claims by paper and then, in the 1980s, 
electronically.  When a health plan participant leaves a prescription at a 
pharmacy, the pharmacy verifies through the PBM that the participant 
has coverage, what copay is required, whether the plan covers the drug, 
and whether pre-approvals are required to fill the prescription.  Once the 
prescription is filled, the pharmacy transmits details regarding the 
patient, health plan number, prescription, and price to the PBM.  The 
PBM responds by approving or disapproving the transaction or by 
instructing the pharmacy to obtain additional information.  The PBM 
then seeks payment from the health plan, whether self-insured or fully 
insured, and forwards the appropriate payment to the retail pharmacy.  
The function of PBMs has changed over the years from simply 
processing prescription transactions to managing the pharmacy benefit 
for health plans.5  Today, PBMs negotiate drug discounts with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, provide drug utilization reviews6 and 
disease management, and, in some instances, create a formulary that 
encourages or even requires health plan participants to use preferred 
formulary products to treat their conditions.7  A common structure is the 
three-tier plan.  The first tier of co-payment, which is the lowest, 
typically provides for a copay of around $10 for generic drugs.  The 
middle tier, with a slightly higher copay, allows for the purchase of 
brand-name drugs that have been determined by the PBM to be the 
preferred brand drugs in the formulary for treating a particular disease 
or condition.  The third tier, allows plan participants to purchase non-
preferred brand drugs with the payment of the highest copay.   
Within the United States, approximately two-thirds of all 
prescriptions filled pass through the hands of PBMs in one way or 
another.  Over the past decade, significant changes have occurred in the 
PBM industry, but regulation of the PBMs has not kept pace with those 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323 
(2002) (describing the functions of PBMs and the lack of an appropriate regulatory scheme); 
Dept. Health & Human Servs., Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, 
Utilization, and Prices (April 2000). 
6 Dep’t Health & Human Servs., U.S. Food & Drug Admin, The Prescription Drug 
Marketing Act Report to Congress, (June 2001); Sheila Shulman, Pharmacy Benefit Management 
Companies (PBMs), Why Should We Be Interested?, 14 PHARMACOECON 49 (1998). 
7 Insurance Changes Alter Drug-Taking Behavior, http://www.reflector.com/health/ 
content/shared-auto/healthnews/drug/516324.html; see also Dr. Haiden Huskamp, 
Formularies and Cost Sharing Issues for Medicare Part D (Oct. 8, 2004). 
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changes.  Despite their involvement in the fulfillment of prescriptions, 
regulation of these entities is largely ad hoc.  The PBMs’ practices have 
been subjected to increasing scrutiny in the past few years and several 
states have attempted to regulate them in light of the dearth of federal 
regulation.  In addition, PBMs, along with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, are the targets of increased litigation. 
The scrutiny of PBMs is likely to increase over the next few years.  
For example, the passage of the Medicare prescription drug bill involves 
PBMs in the administration of drug discount cards for seniors who lack 
prescription drug coverage and in the administration of various plans 
that provide the prescription drug benefit.8  
According to an industry auditor frequently hired by health plans to 
audit their PBMs’ performance, in more than 400 audits “we have never 
found a single situation where something wasn’t wrong.”9  Given the 
amount of litigation in the pharmaceutical and PBM industries, as well 
as attempts by the states to regulate the PBMs, change in the PBM 
industry is ineluctable.10  Yet, attempts at state regulation and the ad hoc 
constraints on behavior that litigation creates will not correct problems in 
the PBM industry quickly and efficiently.  This article explores how the 
PBM industry operates, current regulations affecting the industry, 
problems within the industry, and provides alternatives to the current 
unworkable approach that will help to level the playing field between 
health plans and PBMs by reducing information asymmetry. 
                                                 
8 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395w-141 (2000); Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card, Interim Final Rule and 
notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 69840 (Dec. 15, 2003). 
9 Melissa Davis, Medco, Peers Face New Test from Clients, THESTREET.COM, (Oct. 24, 2004) 
http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/stocks/melissadavid/10190002_2.html.  The auditor, 
Susan Hayes:  
remembers one PBM waiting 10 months to carry out a contract change 
that would have saved its customer $10 million—and then a long fight 
to recover the money. She remembers other PBMs refusing to supply 
information until their clients sued in court. She remembers PBMs 
retaliating against her company “big time” and one even banning her 
firm from auditing its contracts. . . .  The industry needs to be 
overhauled. 
Id. 
10 See Davis, supra note 9 (in which co-author Robert Garis, predicts that “there is going 
to be a cataclysm in the industry”). 
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II.  THE PBM INDUSTRY 
PBMs constitute a growing and lucrative industry.  However, the 
industry is also quite complex.  This Part will explore the PBM industry, 
discussing the basic attributes of PBMs, as well as the relationships PBMs 
have with health plans, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail 
pharmacies.  
There are between forty and sixty PBMs operating in the United 
States, but most of these entities are small.11  The industry is dominated 
by three firms:  Caremark RX, Inc., Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,12 and 
Express Scripts, Inc.13  PBM size can be measured in several ways:  by the 
number of prescriptions they process, the dollar value of those 
prescriptions, or the number of covered lives (which is the industry 
terminology for the number of health plan participants a PBM serves).  
Caremark bought Advance PCS, another large PBM, in 2004 and 
together the combined entity serves 20% of the covered lives in the PBM 
market.  Medco Health Solutions, Inc., serves another 12%, while Express 
Scripts, Inc., serves 10%.14 
The PBMs’ business model has proven extremely lucrative.  In 2006, 
Express Scripts had a net income of $474 million on revenues of $17.7 
                                                 
11 Improving Health Care, supra note 3 (estimating 60 PBMs); Robert F. Atlas, The Role of 
PBMs in Implementing the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 2004 HEALTH AFFAIRS, (Oct. 28, 
2004) at W4-504, 506, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w4.504 
(estimating 40-50 PBMs). 
12 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. is the successor in interest to Merck-Medco Managed 
Care, LLC.  Regarding Merck Medco’s history, see generally Nancy A. Nichols, Medicine, 
Management, and Mergers: An Interview with Merck’s P. Roy Vagelos, HARV. BUS. REV. 113 
(1994). 
13 Joyce Frieden, Consolidation, Lawsuits: Mail Order Rx Numbers May Be on the Rise, 
OB/GYN NEWS, Apr. 15, 2004. The article describes the concentration of PBMs, stating: 
The PBMs see the market differently. “This is a fairly fragmented 
industry,” said Phil Blando, spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Care 
Management Association, a Washington-based trade association for 
PBMs. He noted that his organization has roughly 60 members, 
although “there is really a core group of seven or eight PBMs, none of 
which has more than the high teens in terms of market share or 
revenues.” Besides the independent PBMs; several of the larger 
insurance companies have their own PBM units, he added. 
Id. 
14 A Guide to Drug Cost Management Strategies, from AIS’s exclusive quarterly survey of 
PBMs conducted for Drug Benefit News, http://www.aishealth.com/MarketData/ 
PharmBenMgmt/PBM_market01.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2007); see also Roy Harris, The 
Year of Living Strategically, CFO MAG., Jan. 2007, at 29, 31 (noting that currently, CVS is 
trying to acquire Caremark, a move that “in theory, might allow the company to help 
create better deals for consumers, while it gives itself new revenue opportunities”). 
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billion,15 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. made $630 million on revenues of 
$42.5 billion during the same period,16 and Caremark RX, Inc. made $1.1 
billion on revenues of $36.8 billion in 2006.17 
PBMs profit:  (1) from operating their own mail order pharmacies; 
(2) from providing services such as drug utilization review, rebate 
administration, and data mining; and (3) from negotiating with groups 
such as health plans, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail 
pharmacies.  Through the process of negotiation with each group, the 
PBMs either make money or reduce expenses in various ways.  
Typically, there are four ways that PBMs make a profit.  First, they 
take a share of the “ingredient cost” by contracting to reimburse retail 
pharmacies for drugs at one rate, while charging health plans a higher 
rate.  Second, PBMs receive the fees and rebates mentioned above from 
drug manufacturers.18  Third, the PBMs charge health plans a processing 
fee for each prescription filled.19  Finally, the PBMs compete to some 
degree with the retail pharmacies with which they contract.  The PBMs 
each have a mail order branch and direct a portion of the pharmacy 
transactions through their own mail order branches.  Some PBMs have 
also begun to offer their own discount cards to cash-paying patients who 
do not have health plans.  This allows PBMs to generate additional 
revenue, while offering uninsured customers somewhat lower rates on 
pharmaceuticals. 
The federal government has studied the role of PBMs several times 
over the past decade.20  In the Medicare Modernization Act, passed in 
                                                 
15 EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 55, 
http://www.secinfo.com/dr/ZUm.u2.htm. 
16 MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 69. 
17 CAREMARK RX, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 44. 
18 See PBMs’ revenue sources, rebate accounting procedures explained, DRUG COST 
MANAGEMENT REPORT (Jan. 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NIV/is_1_4/ 
ai_97592327/print (describing access rebates, a type of rebate given for placing a particular 
drug on the PBM’s formulary); Chris Nee, Uncovering the Mysteries Behind Rebates, DRUG 
COST MANAGEMENT REPORT (June 2002), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0NKV/is_6_3/ai_87799122/print (describing the other amounts manufacturers pay 
to PBMs for marketing practices that increase their market share of particular drugs). 
19 See Barbara Martinez, Two Hats: Firms Paid to Trim Drug Costs Also Toil for Drug 
Makers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.pbmwatch.org/update15_ 
100703.html (describing the per transaction processing charge has decreased significantly 
over the past several years to between twenty and thirty cents per transaction from about 
one dollar per transaction). 
20 Cong. Budget Office, Prescription Drug Pricing in the Private Sector, at Glossary (Jan. 
2007) [hereinafter CBO Report]; General Accounting Office, Federal Employees’ Health 
Benefits:  Effects of Using Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Health Plans, Enrollees, and Pharmacies 
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December of 2004, Congress included a provision requiring the Federal 
Trade Comission to study the mail order pharmaceutical business to 
determine whether the PBMs were engaged in self-dealing.21  The FTC 
issued its report in September of 2005, finding that self-dealing by the 
PBMs did not result in noticeably higher prices.22 
The dominant players in the PBM industry process the prescriptions 
dispensed to approximately 200 million Americans, thus earning huge 
annual profits.23  Not only are PBMs extremely profitable, they also 
appear on Fortune’s list of the fastest growing companies in America.24  
Although most large health plans turn to one of the dominant PBMs, 
there are at least twenty PBMs that have systems and retail pharmacy 
networks that can handle large health plans.   
There are two main types of PBMs.  The first is the full-service PBM 
that recommends plan design, handles all plan interaction with retail 
pharmacies, and negotiates rebates and other financial incentives with 
manufacturers.  The second type, PBMs that are not full-service, 
sometimes contract out one or more of these functions to a third party.  
Each type of PBM negotiates with health plans and retail pharmacies 
and, directly or through a third party, with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  The PBM also serves as the intermediary among these 
three groups.   
                                                                                                             
(Jan. 2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-196]; Health Care Financing Admin., Study of 
Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, at 41 (June 2001) [hereinafter Contract No. 500-
97-0399/0097]. 
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-101 (West 2004) (quoting Pub. L. 108-173, Title I, §110, Dec. 8, 
2003, 117 Stat. 2174 (a)) (“The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct a study of 
differences in payment amounts for pharmacy services provided to enrollees in group 
health plans that utilize pharmacy benefit managers.”); cf. Conference Agreement, 149 
Cong. Rec. H. 11877 (2003).  See also GAO-03-196, supra note 20 (noting that the purpose of 
the study was to determine whether self-dealing, which had been identified in an earlier, 
privately funded study, occurs); James Langenfeld & Robert Maness, The Cost of PBM “Self-
Dealing” Under a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit (Sept. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.mpaginc.com/news/pbm report.pdf. 
22 Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies, Fed. Trade 
Commission (Sept. 6, 2005); see also GAO-03-196, supra note 20 (serving as an example of 
government agencies studying the PBM industry); Contract No. 500-97-0399/0097, supra 
note 20 (same). 
23 Improving Health Care, supra note 3, at 14. 
24 See Market-share Analysis Shows Changing PBM Climate, Growth as Medco Spins Off, 
(Aug. 29, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi)m0NKV/is_10_4/ai_107648547 
(noting that “FORTUNE magazine’s list of the 100 fastest growing companies [in 2003] . . . 
includes five PBMs or PBM parent companies among its 22 health care firms.”). 
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A. PBMs’ Relationships with Health Plans 
Sponsors of group health plans include employers and unions.  
Employers may also make health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) 
available to their employees.  The HMOs also deal with PBMs to 
negotiate pricing for plan participants.  Plan sponsors typically choose a 
PBM by sending a request for proposals (“RFP”) to several large PBMs.  
Most health plans retain a consultant from a high-profile firm such as 
Hewitt or Towers-Perrin to advise them during the RFP process.  The 
primary concerns of the health plans typically include pricing, customer 
service, and pharmacy plan design.  
Pricing is partially based on the reimbursement rate for prescription 
drugs.  This rate is typically expressed as the Average Wholesale Price25 
(“AWP”) (a standard industry pricing that, curiously, is neither average 
nor wholesale) less a negotiated percentage for brand name drugs.  AWP 
has been defined as: 
A publicly available list price for sales of drugs by 
wholesales to pharmacies or other providers, the AWP is 
not the actual price that wholesales charge but is more 
like a sticker price in the automobile industry.  The AWP 
is used as the basis for setting payment rates to 
pharmacies.26   
A related concept is the Average Manufacturer Price (“AMP”), defined 
as: 
the average price paid to manufacturers for drugs 
distributed through retail pharmacies.  It includes all 
forms of discounts given to wholesalers and to 
pharmacies, but it does not include rebates paid by 
manufacturers to third-party payers.  The AMP is used 
to calculate the rebates that manufacturers of brand-
                                                 
25 Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy, A Guide to Understanding Common Prescription 
Drug Pricing Terms, at 5 (defining AWP as the price assigned to a drug and is listed in the 
Red Book, First DataBank or Medispan).  AWP is a “suggested list price, and is typically not 
what is paid as buyers may negotiate lower prices through the inclusion of discounts, 
rebates or free products.”  Id.  AWPs, which are used to establish reimbursement rates for 
drugs, are published in the Drug Topics Red Book and other sources. Id.; see Floor Statement of 
United States Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.senate. 
gov/~finance/press/Gpress/2007/prg010807.pdf. (pointing out that a standing joke 
within the industry says the acronym stands for “Ain’t What’s Paid”). 
26 CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary. 
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name drugs are required to give to federal and state 
governments for sales to Medicaid beneficiaries.27   
In other words, the AMP is the price paid by wholesalers to drug 
manufacturers; the wholesaler then marks up the drugs and sells them to 
retail pharmacies. 
For generic drugs,28 the pricing is the Maximum Allowable Cost 
(“MAC”), which is often expressed as an aggregate discount off the AWP 
(for example, an aggregate discount on generics equal to or greater than 
AWP, such as 55%).29  The MAC is “an upper payment limit on the 
ingredient costs for a multiple-source drug.”30  While plan sponsors may 
operate under the illusion that the MAC is actually the maximum price 
allowable, there are often multiple MAC prices.  PBMs use lower MAC 
prices to reimburse pharmacies, while higher MAC prices are charged to 
plan sponsors, increasing the spread retained by the PBM.  PBMs can 
also increase their spreads by charging the plan sponsor a higher MAC 
price.  For example, in a new contract between the plan sponsor and 
PBM, the PBM may give up more in rebate dollars while, unknown to 
the plan sponsor, the PBM starts using a MAC list with a higher unit 
price to maintain profit expectations.  Pricing negotiations will also relate 
to the dispensing fee, which is a flat price per prescription paid to the 
pharmacies for filling the prescriptions and counseling the patients.  In 
addition, pricing negotiations will deal with the rebates from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers that will be passed on to the plan 
sponsor, pricing for mail order fulfillment, drug utilization reviews and 
disease management, as well as administrative fees charged by the PBM 
for its services.   
On January 1, 2005, Medicare changed its reimbursement approach 
from AWP to Average Sales Price (“ASP”).  Although Medicare uses this 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Generic drugs are also referred to within the industry as “multi-source drugs,” while 
brand name drugs are referred to as “single-source drugs.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000) 
and 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.517, 414.904 (2007). 
29 See Academy of Managed Care Physicians, A Guide to Understanding Common 
Prescription Drug Pricing Terms (defining MAC as the price that a health plan establishes as 
the “maximum cost per unit of medication (tablet, capsule, etc.) for that product . . . . Each 
health plan determines its own MAC, and uses its own formula to arrive at the MAC 
price.”).  Health plan administrators do not have the time, systems, or considerable 
expertise that would be necessary to perform these calculations in house.  Instead, each 
health plan contracts with the PBM for these services. 
30 CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary. 
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method, some non-governmental payers are also starting to use ASP.31  
For example, several Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans peg their 
reimbursement rates to Medicare rates.32  Additionally, on January 1, 
2007, pricing throughout the industry changed somewhat with the 
introduction of a new pricing approach as to state Medicaid programs.  
Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,33 Congress imposed a federal 
upper limit (“FUL”) on the federal matching funds that state programs 
receive.34  Each drug’s FUL is now based on the AMP.35  While the AMP 
does not apply to prices charged by the PBMs to health plans, it will 
likely become another accepted source for drug pricing and, if the AMP 
prices are lower, this may exert some downward pressure on the prices 
paid by health plans.   
In addition to paying PBMs for the drugs purchased by plan 
participants, plan sponsors also pay PBMs for providing specialty 
pharmacy services.  Specialty pharmaceuticals include “injectable and 
infusion therapies, high-cost ($5,000 and up per patient per year) 
therapies, and therapies that require complex care.”36  These drugs are 
typically very expensive and may require special handling, such as 
refrigeration.   
Some PBMs also have mail order facilities and may try to shift plan 
participants to fulfillment of prescriptions through mail order rather 
than at retail pharmacies.37  This approach is often used for maintenance 
drugs, such as those for hypertension, asthma, and diabetes to avoid a 
trip to a retail pharmacy and to lower the patient’s copay.  When a PBM 
operates its own mail order facility, it can profit from a single transaction 
by processing the transaction as an intermediary and by receiving the 
dispensing fee and a markup on the drugs.   
                                                 
31 Commercial Payers are Starting to Use Medicare’s Average Sales Price, SPECIALTY 
PHARMACY NEWS (Mar. 2006), http://www.aishealth.com/DrugCosts/DBN_Medicare_ 
Sales_Price.html. 
32 Id. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(e)(4). 
35 See generally GAO, Medicaid Federal Upper Limits, GAO-07-239R, (Dec. 22, 2006). 
36 Defining Specialty Pharmacy:  Services, Markets and Player, 3 DRUG COST MGMT. 
REP., No. 7 (July 2002). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2000); cf. Conference Agreement, 149 Cong. Rec. H. 11877 
(2003).  Concern over whether this occurs caused Congress to include in the Medicare 
Modernization Act, the following language: “The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct 
a study of differences in payment amounts for pharmacy services to enrollees in group 
health plans that utilize pharmacy benefit managers.”  Id. 
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Plan sponsors evaluating proposals from several PBMs are 
concerned with customer service elements of the bid package.  Sponsors 
will review data concerning timeliness and responsiveness to contacts 
from plan participants and network pharmacies.  Plan sponsors are also 
concerned with geo-access to network pharmacies, such that plan 
participants have access to conveniently located pharmacies.  However, 
depending on the nature of the plan sponsor, the pharmacy network 
may be limited.  For example, if the plan sponsor has a single facility, a 
nearby pharmacy may give better rates to the PBM in order to assure 
that plan participants patronize it.  On the other hand, a plan sponsor 
with a geographically dispersed work force must assure that its 
employees have access to network pharmacies wherever they are 
located.   
As part of the plan design aspects of the bid, PBMs often propose 
plan design features that should increase rebate payments to the PBM, 
drive up generic utilization rates, or require preapproval of high cost or 
frequently abused drugs.38  The predominant plan structure is tiered.  
Under the tiered approach, the patient can obtain non-preferred drugs, 
but must pay a higher copayment.  According to the Congressional 
Budget Office, a “formulary” is: 
a list of drugs approved for coverage under a drug 
benefit.  Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) working on 
behalf of health plans determine which drugs are 
therapeutically similar.  Then, for such brand-name 
drugs with several close substitutes, PBMs negotiate 
with manufacturers for lower prices and rebates in 
return for placing the manufacturers’ drugs on their 
formularies. 
The patients served by a PBM may have access to only 
those drugs on a formulary (in the case of a closed 
formulary) or may have access to all prescription drugs 
but at different levels of copayments or other conditions 
(in the case of an open formulary).39 
                                                 
38 Although the lack of transparency in the industry obscures the facts, PBMs may make 
more money creating incentives for consumers to purchase brand name drugs than by 
creating incentives for the use of generic drugs through a formulary. 
39 CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary.  This CBO definition of “formulary” may not 
be entirely accurate.  For example, for plan sponsors, it is unclear whether the PBM is 
actually negotiating for lower prices or just for rebates.  Further, plan sponsors do not have 
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Under a formulary approach, the structure of the pharmacy plan 
provides for lower copays when preferred drugs are used.  In theory, the 
health plan will receive better pricing because placement of the preferred 
drug on the formulary should help to drive market share increases for 
that individual drug.  
In addition to providing for therapeutic substitution (drugs that 
address the same disease or condition in roughly the same manner), the 
formulary may require generic substitution.  That is, the formulary may 
require plan participants to accept the generic drug, which is the 
chemical equivalent of the brand-name drug.  For example, a generic 
cholesterol-reducing drug may carry a $10 copay, while the brand-name 
drug may carry a $20 copay.  This provides an economic incentive to 
plan participants to choose the less expensive generic drug over the more 
expensive brand name drug. 
Formularies can be designed not only to channel participants toward 
generic drugs, but also to channel participants to those drugs deemed 
most cost-effective for treating a particular disease or condition.  
Preferred drugs are those that the PBM’s pharmacy and therapeutics 
(“P&T”) committee selects for a given disease or condition, though it is 
unclear to what extent the selection is based on clinical merit as opposed 
to rebates.  In addition, some formularies use therapeutic substitution, 
which is a switch to a drug that, while not chemically equivalent, has the 
same therapeutic effects as the prescribed drug. 
The formulary may also be structured to maximize manufacturer 
rebates by causing plan participants to shift from one manufacturer’s 
drug to another’s.40  In theory, maximizing rebates lowers the cost of the 
pharmacy plan for all plan participants, but this occurs only if the PBM 
                                                                                                             
access to the information that would be necessary to determine whether the cost of 
rebatable drugs is actually lower than the cost of comparable drugs.  Id. 
40 ANNA COOK & THOMAS KORNFIELD ET AL., THE ROLE OF PBMS IN MANAGING DRUG 
COSTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT 19 (2000). (“The ability of PBMs to 
manage utilization and substitute one drug for another on their formulary motivates 
manufacturers to offer rebates.”).  See also Advance PCS, Annual Report, (Form 10k-405) at 
6 (June 29, 2000), http://sec.edgar-online/2000/06/29/10/0000950134-00-005401/Section8. 
asp (“We have historically derived our clinical revenues primarily from formulary rebates 
and volume discounts received from pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); Robert B. Goldberg, 
Managing the Pharmacy Benefit:  The Formulary System, 3 J. MANAGED CARE PHARM. 565-73 
(1997). 
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passes those savings along to the plan.  The judicious use of appropriate 
generic products also lowers plan costs. 41  
The various categories of drugs included in a health plan’s 
formulary are called “tiers,” with different copays and requirements for 
each tier.  A typical plan may have four tiers, ranging from drugs that 
the P&T committee deems to be extremely cost effective and for which 
the copays will be the lowest, to those brand name drugs that have less 
costly alternatives.  Differences in copays and pre-approval requirements 
are designed to influence plan participants, together with their doctors, 
to choose less costly alternatives, such as generic equivalents, for their 
diseases or conditions.  Because these tiers influence market behavior, 
manufacturers may pay bigger rebates to the PBMs in connection with 
their administration of health plans that have more aggressive 
formularies.  
B. PBMs’ Relationships with Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Generally, PBMs negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers for 
rebates associated with use of the manufacturers’ brand-name drugs.  In 
effect, the manufacturers pay PBMs to increase their market shares.  For 
example, two drug manufacturers may have similar but competing 
drugs to treat asthma.  The manufacturers may pay the PBM rebates or 
other funds for hitting sales targets or increasing the market share of an 
individual drug.  The PBM may also receive rebates for placing the 
manufacturer’s drug on its formulary, which will tend to shift usage to 
the preferred drug.   
In addition to receiving rebates, PBMs are compensated by 
manufacturers for various services, such as distributing, adjudicating, 
                                                 
41 Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (“AMCP”), Comments Regarding the June 26, 
2003 Joint FTC-DOJ Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy, (Pharmaceuticals: 
Formulary) at 2 (Aug. 5, 2003) (“[A] well-desired, properly administered formulary will 
assist in the effective management of a patient’s overall health care.”).  See also U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance, Providing Prescription Drug Coverage Through Medicare: The Role of 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 106th Cong. (2000), at 4-5, in which testimony was given before 
the Committee that: 
PBMs may develop relationships with manufacturers that provide 
lower pricing (through rebates) when a particular drug is on the 
formulary.  The level of rebates will vary by manufacturer and 
prescription drug.  In general, the level of the rebates increases if the 
PBM achieves a greater market share for a drug within a defined class 
of prescriptions with similar therapeutic effects. 
Id. 
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and tracking drug-sample vouchers.42  PBMs may also receive marketing 
or educational money, administration fees43 (fees associated with 
providing data to the pharmaceutical companies) for conducting 
pharmacoeconomics studies, outcomes studies, and disease management 
studies. The amounts earned by the PBMs may be nothing more than 
disguised rebates, but because they are not characterized as rebates, they 
are not passed on to plan sponsors.  AdvancePCS explains these other 
revenues as follows: 
We also earn other revenue from pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for services such as formulary support 
services, outcomes studies and clinical trials.  These 
services are negotiated separately with each 
pharmaceutical manufacturer and specify the services 
we are to perform and the revenues and fees we are to 
earn based on the delivery or completion of the services.  
We also earn revenues from our customers (primarily 
managed care organizations) for disease management 
services provided by Accordant, our wholly owned 
subsidiary. . . .44 
The PBMs’ ability to negotiate effectively with manufacturers has 
been criticized in recent years.  Some argue that the PBMs cannot 
negotiate effectively on a drug-by-drug basis because drug 
manufacturers insist on bundling the drugs and providing aggregate 
pricing.45  Bundling may make it difficult to replace branded drugs with 
generic drugs as generics become available.  If a competing brand drug 
enters the public domain when its patent expires, making generic 
equivalents available, the PBM should notify plan members to switch to 
the generic drug and save on co-payments.  However, this rarely occurs.   
As already explained, PBMs peddle their formularies to health plan 
sponsors.  For large health plans, which may have more than one million 
covered lives, the potential increase in market share from adopting a 
PBM’s formulary may give the PBM additional leverage with the drug 
                                                 
42 David M. Katz, Drug Discount Peddlers, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 28, 2005, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5079733?f=search. 
43 Id.  For example, the PBM may be paid to manage vouchers or coupons offered by the 
drug manufacturer.  Id. 
44 Advance PCS, Annual Report, (Form 10k/A) at 52 (July 29, 2003), http://sec.edgar-
online/2003/07/29/0001193125-03-025659/Section8.asp. 
45 John Carroll, When Success Sours:  PBMs Under Scrutiny, 11 MANAGED CARE 20-26 
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/reference/GMDCPBM/0031a. 
htm. 
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manufacturers.  And placing one manufacturer’s cholesterol-lowering 
drug on the formulary as a preferred drug could help to shift market 
share away from competitors’ drugs in the same therapeutic class.46  For 
this reason, drug manufacturers may pay a combination of rebates, 
marketing fees, and administrative fees to PBMs in exchange for 
placement on a formulary or for providing marketing data to the 
manufacturers.   
C. PBMs’ Relationships with Retail Pharmacies 
PBMs establish networks of pharmacies at which health plan 
participants can have their prescriptions filled.  There is tension between 
having a broad network of retail pharmacies that provide plan 
participants with many retail choices to have prescriptions filled and 
creating a narrow network of pharmacies, although few PBMs establish 
restricted networks.  Retail pharmacies are highly motivated to acquiesce 
to PBMs’ pricing demands to assure that they will be included in the 
PBM’s network of retail pharmacies, resulting in an increase in the 
pharmacy’s market share.  Exclusion from the network means that plan 
participants’ claims cannot be processed automatically and the burden of 
additional paperwork will cause participants to avoid retail pharmacies 
that are not included in their network.  The retail pharmacies are 
generally offered a “take it or leave it” deal to be included in the 
network, with only the largest pharmacy chains having any ability to 
negotiate with the PBMs.   
PBMs offer a dispensing fee to each group of pharmacies that will be 
included in the network.  The dispensing fee is a flat fee paid to the 
pharmacy that ostensibly compensates the pharmacy for overhead while 
providing some measure of profit.  The dispensing fee charged to the 
plan sponsor may be higher than the dispensing fee paid to the retail 
pharmacies, meaning that the PBM keeps the spread as profit. 47   
                                                 
46 Id.; see also Katz, supra note 42.  Katz describes how Express Scripts, Inc., one of the 
three largest PBMs, removed Pfizer’s Lipitor from its formulary in favor of Merck’s Zocor.  
Id.  This move was unusual, because Express Scripts noted that it was influenced by the fact 
that Zocor would soon come off of patent, meaning that generic equivalents should be 
available, whereas Lipitor had another eleven years left on its patents.  Id. 
47 See Katz, supra note 42 (noting, “Another target of scrutiny is how PBMs can unduly 
profit from price spreads. In a typical arrangement, the manager at the PBM agrees with a 
corporate client on a guaranteed price that the client will pay for a drug. If the manager can 
hash out a lower price with the drugstore chain, the PBM pockets the difference”); see also 
Robert I. Garis & Bartholomew E. Clark, The Spread: Pilot Study of an Undocumented Source of 
Pharmacy Benefit Manager Revenue, 44 J. AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 15-21 (2004) (finding the 
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III.  CURRENT REGULATION OF THE PBM INDUSTRY 
Existing regulation of the PBM industry is a patchwork of state and 
federal laws and regulations from assorted government agencies, none of 
which has primary responsibility for regulating this important industry.  
However, because there is no single, comprehensive regulatory scheme, 
the industry has been left largely to its own devices with respect to 
several significant issues.  Litigation and attempts at the state level to 
pass regulatory fixes have resulted in slow and inconsistent approaches 
to the significant issues affecting this segment of the health care industry.  
This Part will discuss federal and state regulation of the PBM industry.   
A. Federal Regulation of the PBM Industry  
There are many different federal regulations that affect the PBM 
industry, however no federal agency has overall responsibility for the 
industry’s regulation.  Further, existing regulations fail to address the 
concerns for fraud and self-dealing discussed in Part I of this article.   
Among the federal regulations that address PBM behavior are the 
Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse statute48 and anti-kickback 
rules.49  Congress amended the statute in 1977 to expand its reach 
beyond bribes, kickbacks, and rebates by making any form of 
remuneration subject to the penalty provisions.50  In 1980, Congress 
added the scienter requirement to allow individuals whose conduct is 
inadvertent to avoid prosecution.51  Conduct proscribed by the act must 
be knowing or willful for liability to attach.52  Penalties for violation of 
the anti-kickback law include up to five years in prison, criminal fines of 
up to $25,000, and civil penalties of up to $50,000.53   
                                                                                                             
“possibility of substantial and widely varying differences in the spread and spread 
percentage between PBMs for brand name and generic medications” and noting that “[a] 
more transparent business model for the PBM industry could produce better relations with 
PBM clients and business partners, including community pharmacies.”). 
48 See Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1-
3) (2000).  The statute protects discounts or other price reductions as long as they are 
“properly disclosed and appropriately reflected.”  Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2004). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000). 
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1),(2) (2000); H.R. Rep. No. 95-393, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056. 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1),(2) (2000); H.R. Rep. No. 96-1167, at 59 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572; see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, at 107 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (2000). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000). 
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The PBMs may, however, qualify for certain safe harbors under the 
anti-kickback rules.54  The anti-kickback statute includes several 
statutory exemptions to prohibited activities.55  The Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services was 
charged by Congress with drafting safe harbors to protect certain types 
of common payment practices from kickback liability.  Accordingly, new 
safe harbors that apply to electronic prescribing were adopted in 2005.56 
Some scholars have noted the difficulty of applying these safe 
harbors to PBM activities.57  These safe harbors may not, however, 
protect PBMs from liability for practices of the types discussed in Part IV 
of this Article, including channeling of prescriptions to their own 
fulfillment facilities, drug switching, kickbacks, and other pricing and 
rebate practices.  Further, the effectiveness of these statutes to curb PBM 
behavior has been criticized, with one author noting:  “Existing federal 
legislation aimed at eliminating healthcare fraud fails to redress the 
potential for conflicts of interest introduced by vertical integration.”58   
In addition to the anti-kickback laws and the regulations 
implementing them, PBMs may also be subject to fiduciary duties under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).59  
ERISA applies to employee benefit plans created by employers “engaged 
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce.”60  It 
                                                 
54 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (stating that an arms-length transaction qualifies for the 
safe harbor protection). 
55 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (exemptions to the anti-kickback statute include: properly 
disclosed discounts under a federal healthcare program; compensation paid to a bona fide 
employee; amounts paid by a vendor to a group purchasing organization if certain 
conditions are met; waivers of co-insurance by federally-qualified health centers; and 
remuneration paid as part of a risk-sharing arrangement).  See generally Dept. of Health and 
Human Servs, Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception to the Anti-
Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
56 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. 
57 Greg Radinsky, The Spotlight on PBMs: Federal Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute 
on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, 36 J. HEALTH L. 213 (2003).  See generally 
Mark Learn, Applying Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Laws to Disease Management 
Programs: Ramifications for the Pharmaceutical Industry and a Regulatory Proposal, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 245 (1996) (providing a general discussion of the anti-kickback rules and their possible 
application to PBM programs). 
58 Elizabeth L. Mitchell, The Potential for Self-Interested Behavior by Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Through Vertical Integration with Pharmacy Benefit Managers:  The Need for a 
New Regulatory Approach, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 162 (1999). 
59 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000); see also AccessRx Program, D.C. Stat. § 48-831.01(2001) 
(imposing a fiduciary duty on all PBM’s to their covered entities). 
60 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a-b) (2000); see 
generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311 (1998) 
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provides that a fiduciary must “discharge his duties with respect to the 
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”61  If the 
fiduciary fails to discharge its duties, the fiduciary is personally liable for 
money damages, restitution, and “such other equitable or remedial relief 
as the court may deem appropriate.”62  The Supreme Court has 
characterized the test for whether an entity is a fiduciary under ERISA as 
a functional test that depends on the control and authority exercised over 
the plan by the entity.63  Regulation of PBMs under ERISA depends upon 
the characterization of PBMs as fiduciaries owing certain duties to plan 
participants.  PBMs have resisted this characterization and routinely 
insist that a disclaimer of fiduciary status under ERISA be included in 
their contracts with health plans.   
The question of whether fiduciary duties apply to PBMs under 
ERISA has been explored in numerous cases.  For example, in Glanton v. 
AdvancePCS Inc.,64 participants in several employer plans sued 
AdvancePCS alleging that the PBM had “secretly been keeping the 
spread between what it charge[d] the plans for drugs and what it [paid] 
suppliers.”65  Plaintiffs argued that AdvancePCS was a plan fiduciary, as 
defined by ERISA, and that they had standing to sue AdvancePCS for 
breach of its fiduciary duty.66  While only deciding the standing issue, 
the court noted:  “It follows that plaintiffs here are authorized to sue 
AdvancePCS for breach of fiduciary duty.”67 
Similarly, in Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc.,68 the plaintiff brought a 
class action lawsuit alleging that Caremark was a plan fiduciary under 
ERISA and breached its various fiduciary duties.69  According to the 
complaint, Caremark enriched itself “through undisclosed discounts, 
rebates, coupons and other forms of compensation from drug companies 
and pharmacies.”70  Caremark had successfully moved to dismiss at the 
                                                                                                             
(noting that ERISA does not apply to plans sponsored by the government and by 
churches). 
61 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). 
62 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000). 
63 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (holding that entities that 
perform services for a plan but are not classified as fiduciaries under ERISA are not subject 
to money damages). 
64 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2005). 
65 Id. at 1124. 
66 Id. Whether an entity is specifically named as a plan fiduciary is not dispositive of the 
issue.  Rather, it depends on the functions of the entity.  Id. 
67 Id. 
68 461 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006). 
69 Id. at 1326-27. 
70 Id. at 1327-28. 
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trial court level “based on lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”71  Although the plan noted 
that participants had the right to sue for plan fiduciaries’ breach of their 
duties, the court explained that this language “merely recites plan 
participants’ general rights under ERISA and does not excuse a 
participant from satisfying the exhaustion requirement.”72  However, 
because the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court 
appropriately dismissed the complaint, it did not reach the specific issue 
of whether Caremark was acting as a plan fiduciary or whether 
Caremark’s alleged conduct violated its fiduciary duties.73  
Central States SE & SW Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco 
Managed Care, LLC, was similar to Bickley in that the plaintiffs in 
consolidated class actions alleged that the PBM was a plan fiduciary and 
had violated its fiduciary duties.74  The issue was whether plaintiffs had 
standing to sue the PBM.  Plaintiffs alleged that Medco “systematically 
misused its fiduciary authority, and its management of formularies and 
drug-switching programs, among other purposes, (i) to increase the 
market share in specific drugs of its parent company Merck, and (ii) to 
divert rebates from drug manufacturers to itself, both at the expense of 
the Plans.”75  At issue before the Second Circuit was whether a proposed 
class settlement was appropriate as to those class members that were 
self-funded plans; thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether the 
PBM was a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA.76   
Whether the services of PBMs, or any other entity performing 
services for a plan, make that entity a fiduciary depends on the extent to 
which “he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or disposition of its assets . . . or . . . he 
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.”77   
PBMs generally insist on language in its contract with the plan 
sponsor specifically disclaiming fiduciary status.  This type of language, 
                                                 
71 Id. at 1328. 
72 Id. at 1329. 
73 Id. at 1326-27. 
74 433 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2005). 
75 Id. at 187. 
76 Id. 
77 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (2000). 
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though, is not dispositive.78  Arguably, PBMs do exercise discretionary 
authority by virtue of the adjudicatory function they perform with 
respect to pharmacy claims by plan participants.  The effects of the 
application of ERISA to PBMs’ activities include prohibitions under 
ERISA on self-dealing,79 the application of fiduciary standards to the 
PBMs,80 and subjection of the PBMs’ activities to reporting and 
disclosure obligations under ERISA.81 
One state law,  Maine’s Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act 
(“UPDPA”),  provides that PBMs are fiduciaries and, as such, have to 
disclose conflicts of interest and remuneration from (and other types of 
financial arrangements with) manufacturers. 82   UPDPA makes each 
PBM a “fiduciary” to its client and requires disclosure of any conflicts of 
interest and any remuneration to the PBM by a prescription drug 
manufacturer or labeler.83  The Act also mandates disclosure of other 
types of information upon request,84 as well as disgorgement of any 
profits inuring from self-dealing.85  Violation of the UPDPA is 
considered a violation of Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.86  In 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assoc. v. Rowe, PBMs successfully 
challenged their characterization as fiduciaries, arguing that Maine’s 
UPDPA was preempted by ERISA.87  However, on appeal, the First 
                                                 
78 Glanton v. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan, 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Kayes 
v. Pac. Lumber, 51 F.3d 1449, 1458-61 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
79 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000); but see Karen Lee, Need for PBM Firewalls Comes Tumbling 
Down, (Mar. 1, 2002), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_km2922/is_200203/ai_n 
6927610/print. 
80 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1105 (2000). 
81 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2000). 
82 Act to Protect Against Unfair Prescription Drug Practices, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 2699 (2005).  The “covered entities” referred to are the PBM’s health plan provider 
customers.  Id. at (1)(A). 
83 Id. at (2)(G).  Accord 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/25 (West Supp. 2007) (providing 
that PBMs must disclose any “conflict(s) of interest” with the state’s Medicaid program). 
84 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2699(2)(D). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at § 2699(4). 
87 307 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Me. 2004) (holding that ERISA preempts Maine’s UPDPA).  See 
also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (stating that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”).  See generally 
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) 
(“[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where 
the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation” ERISA supersedes the state 
law); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
658 (1995); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 462 
U.S. 85, 98 (1983). 
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Circuit held that Maine’s UPDPA did not “relate to” ERISA plans and 
therefore was not preempted by ERISA.88 
In addition to ERISA, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act89 (“HIPAA”) governs the use of protected health 
information90 while providing for limited regulation of PBMs.91  
Agreements between “covered entities,” such as health plans and other 
organizations that provide services to the covered entity, are required to 
assure the confidentiality and protection of the private health 
information.92  
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) also provides a basis for targeting 
PBMs practices that may be fraudulent.93  The liability of PBMs under 
the FCA can be direct liability or indirect liability.94  PBMs can also have 
liability under the Medicaid rebate program, in that the PBM may 
overstate the price offered to it by the manufacturer if the PBM fails to 
take into account “certain payments for benefits provided to PBMs by 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers. . . .“95  The FCA, while useful in 
regulating the PBM industry, is not co-extensive with the industry’s 
business.  Individuals who are health plan participants are generally not 
beneficiaries under Medicare or Medicaid.96  Because no claim is made to 
the government in such cases, the FCA would not apply.  The ability of 
                                                 
88 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305 (1st Cir. 2005). 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000) (requiring a written contract between a health plan or other 
covered entity and the service provider). 
90 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2000) (defining protected health information as any 
information that can be linked to a particular individual). 
91 Id. 
92 See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997).  See generally Steven D. Morgan, Implementing the HIPAA 
Transaction Standards in Managed Care Pharmacy Settings, 16:1 HEALTH L. 14 (Nov. 2003). 
93 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000) (prohibiting knowingly presenting a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment to the government, a prohibition that applies to a 
large number of PBM transactions, if not to all of them following the enactment of a 
Medicare prescription drug benefit by Congress). 
94 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.  Liability under the FCA extends to those who submit false claims 
or cause false claims to be submitted.  This broad coverage of the FCA includes those who 
submit a claim to another, who then submits a false claim.  See, e.g., U.S. of America ex rel. 
A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 447 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(interpreting the FCA); U.S. of America ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (same); U.S. of America ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 
1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). 
95 James G. Sheehan, Prescription Drug Plans, Fraud Schemes, and the False Claims Act, 17 
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD 18, 21 (1999). 
96 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000) (the False Claims Act does contain qui tam 
provisions). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/2
2007] Leveling the PBM Playing Field 53 
the FCA to limit behavior by the PBM is therefore limited to situations 
where the government has been defrauded.   
Even the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(“RICO”)97 provides a statutory basis for attacking PBM practices.98  In 
Morse v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,99  plaintiffs brought a RICO claim 
against a PBM.  The judge allowed a multi-count fraud action to proceed 
against several defendants, including a PBM.100 
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act (“MMA”).101  The MMA created 
Medicare Part D, which provides for a prescription drug benefit for 
Medicare Part A and Part B recipients.  Prescription drug plans (“PDPs”) 
offered as part of the MMA must provide beneficiaries with an adequate 
retail network as well as information about out-of-area coverage.  
Formularies and drug utilization reviews used in or conducted by these 
PDPs must meet the requirements set forth under the MMA.  PBMs are 
regulated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
under the MMA.  CMS is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services that is responsible for administering 
Medicare and working with the states to administer state Medicaid 
programs.  CMS regulates the PBM industry under the MMA by 
establishing regulations regarding rebates, discounts, formularies, mail 
order, reporting, dispensing fees, and networks.102  CMS also has the 
right to review marketing materials prepared under Medicare Part D.103  
Thus, the MMA (through CMS) regulates the activities of the PBMs that 
                                                 
97 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000). 
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).  RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by 
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id.  “Racketeering activity” 
includes, among other offenses, wire and mail fraud.  Id.; see also  Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 
428, 441 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that, a plaintiff must plead under RICO’s § 1962(c) the 
following elements: “(1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of 
racketeering activity”); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) 
(holding that predicate acts must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury); Reves v. 
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 176 (1993) (holding that the “conduct” element “requires some 
participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself”); United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (holding that the “enterprise” must be “a group of 
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct”). 
99 No. 99 C 0193, 2000 WL 246245 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2000). 
100 Id. 
101 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, tit. XI, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
102 42 C.F.R. § 403.806 (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 423.562 (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 423.871 (2005). 
103 42 C.F.R. § 423.50 (2005). 
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are implementing the Prescription Drug Plans.  Medicare, Medicaid, 
SCHIP, and TriCare are all subject to anti-kickback regulations that 
apply to PBMs.104 
Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) published 
draft regulations about advertising and other promotional practices by 
PBMs in 1998.  The FDA administers the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)105 and the regulations implementing it by 
regulating labeling106 and promotional activities107 by manufacturers.  
The FDA’s “Draft Guidance, therefore, tries to fit these relationships 
between PBMs and manufacturers into the categories of labeling and 
manufacturer promotion.”108  The FDA was concerned about the effects 
of PBM promotional practices on patient health, as PBMs engage in 
practices such as drug switching. 
Other federal agencies also provide some level of oversight.  For 
example, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health 
and Human Services participates in the oversight of the PBM industry by 
issuing compliance guides109 and providing certain types of safe harbors 
relating to prescriptions.110 In addition, the Department of Justice 
enforces the laws and regulations that apply to the PBM industry.  It 
does so by investigating allegations of wrongdoing, negotiating consent 
orders that relate to anti-kickback laws under Medicare, Medicaid, and 
TriCare, the military’s benefit plan.   
Further, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) provides some 
oversight of the PBM industry through regulation of business 
combinations within the industry, its implementation of the regulations 
                                                 
104 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b).  The terms “kickback” and “bribe” are not defined in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b. 
105 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301 (2000). 
106 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2000) (stating that labeling “disseminated by or on behalf” of 
the manufacturer constitutes labeling for the purposes of the Act). 
107 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k) (defining regulated advertisements as those “issued or caused to 
be issued” by the manufacturer). 
108 Johnson, supra note 5, at 337 (quoting James G. Sheehan, Fraud and Abuse in the 
Marketing of Ethical Pharmaceuticals Through Pharmacy Benefit Management Programs, 15 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. & MED. DEVICE L. DIG. 49, 52 (1998)). 
109 67 Fed. Reg. 62057-03 (Oct. 3, 2002).  See generally, OIG Pharma Guidelines 
haveImplications for PBMs, Payers, (July 11, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0NKV/is_7_4/ai_105645099. 
110 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. 
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regarding antirust conspiracies,111 and its implementation of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of 
competition”112 and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”113  The FTC 
administers the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which requires pre-merger 
notification to the FTC.114  Also, the FTC issues regulations and guidance 
to the PBM industry in the area of consumer advertising.115 
Finally, federal antitrust laws apply to PBMs, just as to other entities.  
Antitrust claims have been brought under section 16 of the Clayton 
Act116 which allows “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association” to 
seek injunctive relief against threatened loss or “damage by a violation of 
the antitrust laws . . .”117 and under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade.”118   
B. State Regulation of PBMs 
State oversight of PBMs falls under the aegis of several state 
agencies.  These include boards of pharmacy, state insurance 
commissioners, and state Medicaid agencies.  State boards of pharmacy 
regulate PBMs only to the extent that the PBM operates a mail order or 
internet fulfillment facility in the state.119  In these states, the PBM is 
                                                 
111 Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Management Industry:  A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 
309 (1996). 
112 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (prohibiting “unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. . . .”). 
113 Id. 
114 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub.L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390 (1976).  The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act lays out a three-part test for pre-merger notification to the FTC.  Id. 
115 See Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Request for Comments on 
Agency Draft Guidance Documents Regarding Consumer-Directed Promotion, Public Hearing 
Dkt. No. 2004D-0042, Comments Before the Dept. of Health & Human Serv. Food & Drug 
Admin. (May 10, 2004). 
116 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000). 
117 Id. 
118 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  See also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) 
(holding that to be violative of this provision, the action must unreasonably restrain trade); 
U.S. v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (holding that price fixing has been 
held to be a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act); U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (same); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977); Eichorn v. AT&T, 248 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that even if the 
actions complained of are per se illegal, the plaintiff must still allege and prove an antitrust 
injury). 
119 See NCPA Model Bill, Pharmacy Benefit Manager Licensure and Solvency Protection Act, 
http://www.nlarx.com/modelleg/pdfs/NCPA-PBMbill.pdf.  The National Community 
Pharmacists Association (“NCPA”), the industry organization that represents independent 
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regulated like any other retail or mail order pharmacy facility.  Some 
states regulate claims processing performed by PBMs.120  State Medicaid 
agencies also regulate claims processing and drug utilization review 
services by the PBMs.121  Finally, states may regulate the activities of 
PBMs through their consumer protection laws, such as unfair 
competition laws and consumer fraud laws.122  For example, many states 
have antitrust laws based on the Uniform State Antitrust Act.123  States 
may also have their own versions of anti-kickback laws.  These laws 
prohibit pharmacists from accepting payments for referrals or to 
promote the sales of goods or services. 
The National Association of Health Insurance Commissioners’s 
(“NAIC”) Health Insurance and Managed Care Committee created the 
Pharmaceutical Issues Working Group to consider state-level and other 
regulation of PBMs.  The NAIC drafted model legislation on prescription 
drug benefit management activities.  The ability of NAIC members to 
                                                                                                             
pharmacies, has developed model legislation providing for state boards of pharmacy and 
insurance commissioners to monitor the activities and financial stability of PBMS.  Id.  The 
NCPA believes that PBMs are practicing pharmacy and should, therefore, be regulated as 
pharmacies.  Id.  The NCPA’s model bill provides for a license specifically for PBMs.  Id. 
120 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6131 (West 2005). 
121 See 42 C.F.R. § 456.722(a) (2000).  The regulation states: 
Each Medicaid agency, at its option, may establish, as its principal (but 
not necessarily exclusive) means of processing claims for covered 
outpatient drugs, a point-of-sale electronic claims management (ECM) 
system to perform on-line, real-time (that is, immediate) eligibility 
verifications, claims data capture, adjudication of claims, and to assist 
pharmacists and other authorized persons (including dispensing 
physicians) in applying for and receiving payment. 
Id.  The regulations go on to set minimum systems functional requirements.  Id. at 
456.722(b) & (c). 
122 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521 (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 Ch. 2-
A (2007);  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6 § § 2511, 2531 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §501.201 (2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 504/1 (West 1998); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 714.16 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1410, 15:1410 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. Tit. 5, §205-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 13-101 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, §1 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0903 (West 2007); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-350, 63(12) (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1.1 (West 
2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.605-646.656 (West, 2007); 73  PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-1 
(West 2007); TEX. BS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451 
(West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-196 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010 
(West 2007). 
123 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1401 (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 Ch. 2-
A (2007); D.C. CODE § 28-4501 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §542.15 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
101 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:121 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 205-A (2007); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, § 1 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.771 (West 
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1 (West 2007); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2007); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN.  § 133.01 (West 2007). 
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affect the regulation of PBMs is limited, however, because state 
insurance commissioners may only regulate health insurers.  Arguably, 
unless a health plan is capitated, the PBM is not providing health 
insurance.124  For these reasons, state insurance commissioners have only 
a limited ability to influence the activities of PBMs.   
In addition, to the extent that a PBM assumes some of the risk 
associated with a particular pharmacy plan, state departments of 
insurance may regulate the entity.125  PBMs may also be regulated by 
state departments of insurance depending on the structure of the 
pharmacy plans the PBMs design for their health plan clients.  In some 
instances, PBMs may charge a flat fee or a fee per covered life, agreeing 
to assume the risk that the actual pharmaceutical expenses will exceed 
this fee.  The contract between the health plan and the PBM might also 
be negotiated to require that a portion of the PBM’s fee is placed “at risk” 
and depends on the PBM’s performance. For example, AdvancePCS 
describes its rebate guarantees as follows:  
Agreements with certain health plan sponsor customers 
contain provisions that require us to obtain a minimum 
rebate per claim from pharmaceutical manufacturers in 
order to generate additional savings for health plan 
sponsor customers.  Failure to achieve the minimum 
rebate per claim results in an obligation by us to the 
health plan sponsor customer.  The obligation is 
equivalent to the difference between the actual rebate 
per claim obtained and the minimum stated in the 
health plan sponsor customer agreement, which is then 
multiplied by the number of claims processed in a 
specified period.  We continually monitor the health 
plan sponsor customers’ rebate per claim and recognize 
                                                 
124 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 176D, §3B (West 2007) (enacting “any willing provider” 
statutes that apply to pharmacy networks, as well as other types of networks).  See, 
generally Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 363 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’d 
sub nom.  Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (holding that an “any 
willing provider” law did not violate ERISA’s preemption of state laws). 
125 See State Insurance Commissioners Weigh PBM Regulations This Month, MANAGED CARE 
MAG. (Mar. 2000), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0003/0003.states.html.  
PBMs sometimes enter into capitated agreements with health plans under which the PBM 
charges a fixed, or capitated, fee for all covered lives.  Id.  Under this type of arrangement, 
the PBM assumes the risk of losses in excess of amounts charged.  Id. When PBMs enter 
into capitated agreement, they may become subject to regulation by the state’s insurance 
commission.  Id. 
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a liability when it appears unlikely the average rebate 
per claim will meet or exceed the stated minimum.126   
Existing agencies and state regulations have been insufficient to 
address the issues identified in Part IV of this article.  For these reasons, 
several states have proposed new legislation that specifically targets 
PBMs.  PBMs have fought against these proposed disclosure statutes, 
which have often been supported by retail pharmacies.127  
Thus, some states have considered, but not yet adopted, legislation 
patterned on the NCPA’s model bill.128  In several other instances, 
statutes regulating at least some of the PBMs’ business practices or 
requiring the licensure within the state have been considered.129   
The District of Columbia also passed a law to regulate PBMs.130  The 
Access Rx Act, as it is known, requires PBMs to act as fiduciaries, to 
notify health plans of any conflicts of interest, to pay over all payments 
or rebates received from drug manufacturers, and to disclose all financial 
terms with manufacturers upon request.131  That Act is now in litigation 
and its effective date has been suspended by a court injunction.  The 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association sued the District of 
Columbia and was granted injunctive relief because the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that plaintiffs would 
suffer irreparable harm if the District of Columbia was allowed to 
enforce the Act.132  The plaintiff specifically challenged those portions of 
the act that imposed fiduciary duties on PBMs133 and required them to 
                                                 
126 Advance PCS, Annual Report (Form 10-Q), at 54 (Aug. 13, 2003), http://sec.edgar-
online.com/2003/08/13/0001193125-03-036190/Sectin9.asp. 
127 Rob Eder, Nothing More ‘transparent’ than PBM Posturing—Prescription Benefit 
Management, DRUG STORE NEWS (Sept 22, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m3374/is-12-25/ai_108969842/print. 
128 See, e.g., H.B. 493, 421st Leg. (Md. 2006); H. File 1989, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005); H.B. 1374 
(N.C. 2005); H.B. 714 (Pa. 2005); S.B. 828 (S.C. 2005). 
129 See, e.g., H.B. 171 (Ala. 2006); S.B. 483, 580 (Conn. 2006); H.B. 516 (Del. 2006); H.B. 31 & 
S.B. 1440 (Haw. 2005); S.B. 2799 (Ill. 2006); H.B. 160  & S.B. 181 (Iowa 2005); H.B. 5442 & S.B. 
2697 (Miss. 2006); S.B. 2697 (Miss. 2006); H.B. 1247 N.H. 2006); S.B. 1291 (N.J. 2006); S.J. 
Memorial 22, 47th Leg. (N.M. 2006); H.B. 2392 (Okla. 2006); S.B. 2247 (R.I. 2006); S.B. 2847 & 
H.B. 2971 (Tenn. 2006); SB. 261 (Vt. 2006); H.B. 945, 2473 (Va. 2006); H. Con. Res. 81, 78th 
Leg. (W. Va. 2006). 
130 D.C. CODE § 48-831.01 (2001) et seq. 
131 Id. 
132 Memorandum Opinion Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21, 
2004), Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. The District of Columbia, CV 04-1082 (D.D.C.).  
The plaintiff argued that the Act was preempted by ERISA and that the Act violated the 
Takings and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution.  Id. 
133 D.C. CODE § 48-832.01 (2001). 
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make certain financial disclosures.134  The Access Rx Act also regulates 
PBMs’ drug switching practices.135 
Additionally, Georgia passed legislation in 2002 that requires 
licensure of PBMs as pharmacies and allows for inspection of PBM 
premises, whether located in Georgia or elsewhere.136  In 2006, Georgia 
passed another law that provides for audit rights by third party payors 
dealing with PBMs.137   
Numerous other states have passed statutes regulating PBMs, 
including Kansas, which passed legislation in 2006 that requires PBMs to 
register with the state’s insurance commissioner.138  Also, Maryland 
passed a law in 2003 that requires the State’s Insurance Department to 
examine PBMs at least triennially.139  Louisiana also regulates PBMs as a 
third party administrator under state insurance regulations.140  Similarly, 
Mississippi has subjected PBMs to some oversight by the state Insurance 
Department.  Mississippi’s Pharmacy Benefit Prompt Pay Act, passed in 
2006, requires PBMs to file financial statements with the state Insurance 
Department, use nationally recognized pricing databases, and pay claims 
within fifteen days.141  North Dakota requires that PBMs register as an 
administrator with that state’s insurance department, disclose ownership 
of the PBM, comply with certain requirements regarding drug 
substitution, offer to health plans a transaction fee without sharing 
payments received from drug manufacturers, and allow health plans to 
audit the PBM’s books.142  Rhode Island also requires PBMs to register as 
third party administrators and to file annual reports with the state 
insurance commissioner that includes a complete description of all 
financial arrangements between the PBM and other entities, such as drug 
manufacturers.143  Additionally, South Dakota requires registration of 
the PBM as a third party administrator, requires the PBM to perform its 
duties in the exercise of good faith and fair dealing, requires the PBM to 
                                                 
134 Id. at § 48-832.01(c)(1)(A). 
135 Id. at § 48-832.01(d). 
136 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-110.1 (West 2007). 
137 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-118 (West 2007). 
138 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3821 (2006). 
139 MD. CODE ANN., INS.  § 15-10B-20 (2007). 
140 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3031 (2007). 
141 MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-126 (2007). 
142 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-27-02-07 (2007). 
143 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29.1 (2007). 
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disclose rebate and other revenues, and gives the health plan audit 
rights.144 
Finally, Maine passed a law regulating PBMs in June of 2003.145  The 
Maine law provides that PBMs are fiduciaries and must act “with care, 
skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with the standards of 
conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enterprise of like character and 
with like aims.”146  Under the statute, the PBM must provide all financial 
information requested by the health plan and must transfer to the plan 
any payments received from drug manufacturers for drug 
substitutions.147   
In September of 2004, the PBM industry group, the PCMA, filed suit 
in the United States District Court in Maine seeking to enjoin the law on 
the basis of ERISA preemption.  The PBM industry argued before the 
law’s passage that it would destroy the competitive market for drugs, 
compromise PBM trade secrets, conflict with ERISA and FEHBA, violate 
the takings and due process clauses of the United States and state 
constitutions,148 and would have allowed unfettered enforcement under 
state unfair trade practices acts.149  Maine’s law, like that of the District of 
Columbia, would have characterized PBMs as fiduciaries.  As a 
fiduciary, the PBM would have disclosure obligations and would be 
prohibited from self-dealing.  PBMs have fought characterization as 
fiduciaries in the past.150  When PBMs negotiate with health plans they 
typically insist on a provision that specifically states that they are not 
plan fiduciaries, though the contract language is not dispositive of the 
issue.  Maine’s law was an example of legislators’ attempt to divide and 
conquer.  The law would have grandfathered and exempted some PBMs, 
while others would have been subject to all of the law’s provisions.   
                                                 
144 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E (2007). 
145 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2699 (2007). 
146 Id. at § 2699(2)(A). 
147 Id. at § 2699(2)(D). 
148 See Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 164, 178-79 (D. Me. 
2004), aff’d 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2360 (2006) (finding that 
mandatory disclosure requirements under Maine’s UPDPA could destroy the value of the 
PBMs’ trade secrets); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); see also 
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the 
protection afforded by the Takings Clause includes protection of intangible property, such 
as trade secrets). 
149 Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, More Disclosure for Drug Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 
2003. 
150 See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/2
2007] Leveling the PBM Playing Field 61 
In addition to passing legislation to rein in PBMs, states can affect 
PBMs through their own contracting processes.151  When a state sends a 
request for proposals (“RFP”) to the various PBMs, the state can require 
the PBMs to promise a degree of pricing transparency, reporting, and 
audit rights.  When the low-cost PBM is selected, the state’s contract with 
that PBM should include the pricing and reporting provisions necessary 
to assure appropriate pricing, transparency, and audit rights. 
IV.  IMPACT OF THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND INADEQUATE 
REGULATION 
The PBMs are the common counterparty with health plans, retail 
pharmacies, and drug manufacturers.  Thus, no single entity of these 
entities knows the economics of the transactions with the other 
counterparties.  This lack of transparency has created an environment in 
which PBMs may engage in practices that involve self-dealing or that are 
prohibited under various laws.  Examples of these practices include drug 
switching, channeling certain prescriptions to the PBMs’ own mail order 
or specialty pharmacies, and certain rebate and pricing practices.  The 
PBMs, which are ostensibly hired by health plans as the agents for those 
plans to negotiate with manufacturers and retail pharmacies, hide from 
their own clients what they pay for prescriptions and often fail to 
disclose appropriate information regarding rebates.152  One industry 
expert who has studied PBMs for years stated:  
What seems clear from this navigation of the PBM maze 
is that prescription benefit plan sponsors (either private 
employers or government entities) should insist on full 
disclosure of cash flows to and through the PBM that is 
administering their drug benefit.  Without this level of 
scrutiny, the plan sponsor cannot be sure if its PBM is 
providing a good service for a fair price or is acting 
primarily in its own interest.153   
                                                 
151 See generally Kimberley Fox et al., State Pharmacy Discount Programs: A Viable 
Mechanism for Addressing Prescription Drug Affordability?, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187 
(2004). 
152 Davis, supra note 9. (“[T]he giant PBMs continue to hide plenty from their own clients 
in the name of competition. Many PBMs refuse to show exactly what they pay for 
prescriptions because, they say, manufacturers—and not customers—would benefit from 
such knowledge.”). 
153 Robert I. Garis et al., Examining the Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies, 
AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, 81, 85 (2004). 
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The PBM industry argues that legislation mandating disclosure will 
harm the PBM industry and reduce the discounts that the PBMs are able 
to negotiate on behalf of health plans.  This argument is based on a study 
performed on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Association by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, stating that disclosure of this 
type “is not required of other healthcare organizations.  In a competitive 
environment, the ability to negotiate in confidentiality is paramount.  
Without such confidentiality, competition, and the benefits derived from 
it, is eroded.  Those benefits include lower costs achieved through a 
competitive model.”154  
Yet, this argument is contradicted by South Dakota’s recent 
experience.  As noted previously, in 2004, South Dakota passed 
transparency legislation of the type opposed by the PCMA.155  Despite 
the passage of the legislation, pharmacy prices in South Dakota appear 
to be no higher than prices elsewhere.  In addition, although PBMs 
fought the legislation by arguing that they would be forced to leave 
South Dakota, none have done so since the legislation’s enactment. 
PBMs are concerned that transparency legislation would require the 
public disclosure of information such as: (1) agreements with 
manufacturers regarding rebates, discounts, and incentives; (2) 
agreements favoring one manufacturer’s product over another; (3) 
agreements regarding whether a product will be placed on (or removed 
from) a formulary list; and (4) agreements regarding how much the PBM 
bills the client or reimburses the pharmacy.156  In other words, if 
transparency legislation were passed, the PBMs would be forced to 
compete on the basis of price, rather than on the basis of obfuscation.  
The PBMs argue the manufacturers and retail pharmacies would be less 
willing to negotiate aggressively with PBMs if they knew that the 
agreement would be made public.157  
David Balto, former policy director for the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Competition, has observed that these PBM 
arguments “are inconsistent with economic theory, antitrust law and 
common sense . . . . To the contrary, greater transparency will enhance 
                                                 
154 The Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management and the National Cost Impact of Proposed PBM 
Legislation, at 16 (July 2004). 
155 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E (2007). 
156 The Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management and the National Cost Impact of Proposed PBM 
Legislation, at 16 (July 2004). 
157 Id. at 17. 
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competition and lower prices.”158  Economists generally agree that 
transparent pricing ensures survival of the best firms and will result in 
lower prices as the firms compete with each other for market share.159  
An antitrust attorney recently characterized PBMs as having an 
oligopoly and contended that it is “patently absurd” to assume that 
manufacturers would stop offering rebates if transparency were 
increased.160  Arguably, the market power that PBMs wield stems both 
from market share and also from the paucity of information available to 
those who deal with the PBMs.161   
Transparency can be especially important in controlling costs in the 
healthcare arena, as has been demonstrated in other fields.  For example, 
in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,162 the Supreme Court found that a 
conspiracy among dentists to refuse to provide x-rays to managed care 
providers suppressed competition.163  Where a third party, even a 
buying consortium, acts as an intermediary between willing buyers and 
                                                 
158 See Eder, supra note 127. 
159 Jack Guynn, President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Keynote Address at the 
Carter Center Conference on “Transparency for Growth in the Americas” (May 4, 1999): 
[T]he benefits of transparency . . . far outweigh the costs; that in the 
long run all of these things lead to greater economic growth and 
stability; and that the benefits ultimately accrue to the individual and 
society as a whole. . . . [I]n a market for goods in which quality varies 
and in which the seller has more information about the quality of the 
goods being offered than the buyer, good products and bad products 
must sell at the same price. When buyers have no way to distinguish 
between products — when they are forced to assume the worst — the 
market price tends to be the lemon price, and good sellers eventually 
leave the market. Thus do bad cars, bad money — bad whatever — 
drive out the good. 
“The purchaser’s problem . . . is to identify quality.” [Professor] 
Akerlof said, “There may be potential buyers of good quality 
products and there may be potential sellers of such products in the 
appropriate price range; however, the presence of people who wish to 
pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the legitimate 
business. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the 
amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include 
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.” 
Id. 
160 See Eder, supra note 127. 
161 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977) (noting that restrictions 
on pricing transparency “increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller” and 
“perpetuate the market position of established” sellers); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. 
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 431 (2000). 
162 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
163 Id. at 454-55. 
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sellers dealing on an arm’s length basis, this can constrain the buyers and 
sellers from independently reaching an appropriate price.164   
Aside from the economic argument regarding the pricing impact of 
non-transparent business practices, there have been several suggestions, 
primarily in litigation against the PBMs, that these entities engage in a 
number of illegal business practices.  These include drug switching,165 
channeling prescriptions to entities owned by the PBMs, and various 
other rebate and pricing schemes.  A number of lawsuits have been 
brought around the country against the PBMs for these practices.  
A. Drug Product Switching 
The business model used by PBMs allows them to engage in drug 
product switching, which occurs when a prescription is switched from 
one drug to another that has similar therapeutic characteristics and will 
not change the patient’s health outcome differently than the first drug.  
Switching can occur because of the influence PBMs exercise on doctors166 
                                                 
164 Kartell v. BCBS of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that Blue Cross 
intervened in the market to keep buyers and sellers from reaching arm’s length agreements 
on pricing and service); see also Austin v. BCBS of Ala., 903 F.2d 1385, 1391 (11th Cir. 1990).  
In Austin, the court noted that where the purchaser sets pricing, it may be predatory 
pricing.  Id.  The issue identified by the Austin court was “whether, standing alone, Blue 
Cross’ use of its market power to gain lower rates for its subscribers from hospitals 
violate[d] the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 1390.  The Austin court looked to Travelers Insurance 
Company v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 
(1973), in which the Third Circuit stated: 
In its negotiating with hospitals, Blue Cross has done no more than 
conduct its business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the best 
deal possible. This pressure encourages hospitals to keep their costs 
down; and, for its own competitive advantage, Blue Cross passes along 
the saving thus realized to consumers. To be sure, Blue Cross’ initiative 
makes life harder for commercial competitors such as Travelers. The 
antitrust laws, however, protect competition, not competitors; and stiff 
competition is encouraged, not condemned. 
Id. at 84. 
165 Milt Freudenheim, Medco to Pay $29.3 Million to Settle Claims of Drug Switching, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27 2004 at C1. 
166 Victoria Stagg Elliott, Physicians Say No to Automatic Therapeutic Drug Substitutions, 44 
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.ama-assn.org/amendnews/2001-01-
01h1120101.htm; cf. AM. MEDICAL ASSOC., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8 (2006-2007) (stating 
that physicians must not allow their professional judgment to be influenced by 
inappropriate outside persuasion); American Medical Association Opinion E-8.06, 
Prescribing and Dispensing Drugs and Devices, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
category/8483.html (same). 
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and individual consumers through advertising167 and through the PBM’s 
disease management businesses.168  Some scholars have written about 
the practice of switching169 as a possible violation of the anti-kickback 
law.170 
The states have been active in suing PBMs to curb perceived pricing 
abuses and to recover for past abuses.  For example, in April of 2004, 
attorneys general from twenty states settled claims under state deceptive 
trade practices laws against Medco Health Solutions, Inc.171  The 
complaint alleged unfair trade practices and that Medco encouraged 
therapeutic switching, or switching patients from a lower cost or generic 
drug to a brand name drug to allow the PBM to earn higher rebates or 
incentive payments.  According to the lawsuit, Medco did not pass its 
savings from therapeutic switching on to patients or health plan 
sponsors.  Eliot Spitzer, in response, stated:  “This case shows how 
[PBMs] previously hid from consumers, doctors and health plans that 
they were switching prescriptions to promote their own profits.”172  
Health plans are concerned about drug switching because, although the 
drugs may address the same condition, a switch from one drug to 
another often requires follow-up testing and office visits, all of which 
come at a cost to the plan.   
The suit settled in April 2004, with Medco agreeing to pay $20.2 
million to the states, $6.6 million in fees and costs, and $2.5 million to 
patients.173  The Consent and Stipulation entered into by Medco prohibits 
                                                 
167 PR Mansfield et al., Direct to Consumer Advertising is at the Crossroads of Competing 
Pressures from Industry and Health Needs, BRITISH MEDICAL J. 330:5-6 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.chspr.ubc.ca/node/116. 
168 Bruce Ingersoll, Drugs: FDA to Watch Drug Switching, Sales Practices, WALL ST. J., JAN. 
6, 1998, at B1 (stating that the idea behind disease management programs is that non-
compliance with prescription drug regimes is likely to result in higher costs to the health 
plan because lack of compliance can lead to emergency room visits or hospital stays). 
169 See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care 
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 467-74 (1988); see also Learn, supra note 57, at 249; 
Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies or Cost-Effectiveness?: 
Application of the Medicare Anti-kickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug 
and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 309 (1999). 
170 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (defining “remuneration” as “including any kickback, bribe or 
rebate”). 
171 See Press Release, New York Attorney General, 19 States Settle Deceptive Trade Practices 
Claims Against Medco Health Solutions (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 
2004/apr/apr26b_04.html. 
172 Id. 
173 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The United States Settles Its Anti-Fraud Claims for 
Injunctive Relief and 20 State Attorneys General Settle Unfair Trade Practices Claims Against 
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the company from soliciting drug switches in situations where the PBM 
benefits at the expense of these other parties.  Medco also agreed to take 
certain prospective steps, such as disclosing to prescribers and patients 
any financial incentives Medco has for drug switching.174  In addition, 
Medco must comply with certain forward-looking disclosure obligations, 
must establish processes to obtain express permission to switch drugs, 
must monitor the health effects of drug switches, and must adopt the 
code of ethics of the American Pharmacists Association.175 
The Prescription Access Litigation Project, the American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and the AFL-CIO filed 
another significant lawsuit in 2003 against Advance PCS, Express Scripts, 
Medco Health Solutions, and Caremark.176  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
PBMs negotiated lower prices with drug manufacturers, but failed to 
pass those cost savings on to the plans they represented, artificially 
inflating prices.177  According to the President of AFSCME, “It’s 
corporate greed like this that is chipping away at the paychecks of hard 
working men and women across the country.”178  
B. Channeling Prescriptions to PBM-Owned Businesses 
The use of mail order as a prescription fulfillment channel has 
increased in the past few years and litigation relating to mail order 
fulfillment by PBMs is likely to increase in the near future.179  For health 
plan participants, mail order provides convenience and can also provide 
for a lower copay, as the copay for a ninety-day supply of drugs will 
generally be less than the copays for three thirty-day supplies.  Concerns 
about mail order fulfillment exist largely because the major PBMs 
operate their own mail order facilities, giving them an additional 
opportunity to profit from transactions by health plan participants.   
                                                                                                             
Medco Health Solutions (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.us doj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2004/ 
apr/medcoinjunctivereliefrelease.pdf. 
174 Id. 
175 American Pharmacists Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists (adopted Oct. 27, 
1994), http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=2654& 
TEMPLATE=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm. 
176 AFSCME v. AdvancePCS, No. BC 292227 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty. Apr. 4, 
2003). 
177 Id. 
178 Press Release, AFSCME, Pharmacy Benefit Managers Charged with Inflating Prescription 
Drug Prices Lawsuit Alleges Secret Deals between PBMs & Pharmaceutical Companies (Mar. 18, 
2003), http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/reference/LMCOPBM/0010a.htm. 
179 Judith A. Waltz, Multimillion Dollar Settlement Signals Government’s Increased Scrutiny of 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 DRUG BENEFIT TRENDS 15, 15-16 (2001), http://www.medscape. 
com/viewarticle/414901. 
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Fulfillment through mail order facilities operated by the PBMs can 
increase costs to health plans in several ways.  First, generic dispensing 
in PBM-owned facilities is increasing and mail tends to employ higher 
spreads on generic drugs than retail pharmacy dispensing.180  The 
enhanced generic spread in mail order fulfillment comes in addition to 
the rebates PBMs receive for brand drug dispensing.  Second, PBMs may 
channel patients toward higher-priced drugs through switching.  The 
mail order facility has a call center whose task is to contact physicians 
and switch patients to the “preferred” (rebatable) drugs.  Third, they 
may also fulfill prescriptions for high-priced specialty pharmaceuticals 
themselves.  Fourth, they may channel prescriptions through their own 
fulfillment facility, rather than to the facility that can fill the prescription 
the most inexpensively.  Fifth, they charge the plan for processing the 
transaction, both as a PBM and as a fulfiller.  Sixth, waste is higher for 
mail order fulfillment because plan sponsors pay for a ninety-day supply 
of a prescription that may or may not work for a particular participant.181  
If the prescription does not work, the participant must then have another 
prescription filled.   
A study that was funded by retail pharmacies noted that PBMs 
might steer participants to higher priced drugs on which the PBMs earn 
higher rebates.182  For example, a mail order facility may be less inclined 
to channel a participant toward a generic drug, when the PBM that owns 
the mail order facility makes more in rebates on the brand name drug.  
Another area of increased profits relating to PBM mail order practices 
                                                 
180 Press Release, Caremark Rx, Inc., Caremark Rx, Inc. Reports Second Quarter 2006 
Earnings:  Company Raises Full Year 2006 Earnings Guidance (Aug. 8 2006), http://sec.edgar-
online.com/2006/08/08/0001193125-06-164865/Section2.asp (stating “Mail pharmacy 
revenues increased 11% to $3.2 billion and mail pharmacy claims were 15.2 million, up 5% 
from the second quarter of 2005.”); Press Release, Express Scripts, Inc., 9.5 Million Shares 
Repurchased During the Quarter (July 26, 2006), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix. 
zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=888008&highlight= (“As a result of the success of 
our formulary strategy, and strong underlying trends for continued growth in generic 
utilization, specialty pharmacy and home delivery, we are raising our 2006 earnings 
guidance.”); Press Release, Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Medco Reports Second-Quarter 2006 
GAAP Earnings of $0.56 per Share (Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.alacrastore.com/ 
storecontent/newstex/PRN-000510024901 (“The sequential increase in EBITDA per 
adjusted prescription was driven primarily by an 80 basis point increase in the generic 
dispensing rate at mail, an increase in adjusted mail penetration, and stronger Accredo 
Health Group margins.”). 
181 Norman V. Carroll et. al., Comparison of Costs of Community and Mail Service Pharmacy, 
45 J. AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 336, 336-43 (2005) (“The available evidence suggests that the 
wastage rate for mail service pharmacies is about two times greater than that for 
community pharmacies.”). 
182 Langenfeld, supra note 21. 
Garrett and Garis: Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit Management Ind
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
68 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
would be inflation of AWP by use of relabeled drugs, although this is 
less prevalent today than it was a few years ago.  Another concern is 
whether the PBMs allow for a three-month prescription to be filled only 
at their own mail order facilities.183   
Because of the concerns about the potential for self-dealing in cases 
where the PBM owns a mail order facility, Congress required the Federal 
Trade Commission to study these issues.  This “Conflict of Interest 
Study” reviewed whether there are cost differences between prescription 
drugs dispensed by mail in PBM-owned mail order pharmacies and 
those that are not owned by PBMs.  The Federal Trade Commission’s 
study was released in August of 2005.184   
The study found a link between increases in prescription drug costs 
and a PBM’s activities as both manager of a plan and operator of its own 
mail order pharmacy.185  For example, generic substitution rates tended 
to be higher when PBMs filled the prescriptions using mail order 
pharmacies owned by others than when PBMs filled the prescriptions 
using their own mail order pharmacies.186   
Other reviews of the mail order industry have concluded, however, 
that health plans’ mail order costs tend to be higher than their retail 
costs.187  This is because the plan sponsor typically agrees to allow 
participants to obtain a ninety-day supply for the equivalent of two co-
payments rather than three.  This loss of a co-payment “has become a 
major cost to health plans.”188  Although mail order fulfillment was less 
expensive for health plan participants, “[f]rom the health plan’s 
perspective, the loss of copayments in the mail service benefit was 
greater than the savings on ingredient costs and dispensing fees.”189 
                                                 
183 10 Federal News, Antitrust Scrutiny Likely to Increase for PBM Mail-Order Arrangements, 
Lawyers Say, No. 12 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.badfiathinsurance.org/ 
reference/GMCOPBM/0043a.htm. 
184 FTC, Pharmacy Benefit Managers:  Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. 
185 See Langenfeld, supra note 21. 
186 Id. 
187 Bartholemew E. Clark et. al., Poster Presentation: Implications of Incentives Increasing 
Mail-Service Pharmacy Utilization, Academy Health Annual Research Meeting (June 26-28, 
2005), http://chpe.creighton.edu/chpe/snapshots/garis/Snapshot_Garis.pdf. 
188 Carroll, supra note 181, at 336. 
189 Id. 
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C. Rebate and Pricing Schemes 
Various lawsuits have alleged that PBMs perpetrate several types of 
schemes, including schemes relating to rebates, formulary decisions, 
mail order decisions, and spreads.  For example, in In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litigation, a manufacturer of generic prescription drugs alleged 
that the manufacturer of name-brand drugs had paid rebates to PBMs to 
assure that the name brand rather than the generic oral anticoagulant 
drug was prescribed.190  The district court refused to grant a motion to 
dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff had stated a claim for commercial 
bribery.191   
In Mulder v. PCS Health Systems, Inc., the trial court certified a class 
comprised of plans administered by PCS Health Systems. 192  The PBM 
moved for summary judgment arguing that it was not a fiduciary for 
purposes of ERISA.193  The district court agreed194 with the PBM’s 
argument that claims processing, formulary establishment, rebate 
processing, and drug utilization reviews did not render the PBM a plan 
fiduciary under ERISA.  The court noted that the concept of a fiduciary 
under ERISA is elastic; an entity might meet the definition of fiduciary 
for certain purposes, but not for others.195  The court then examined each 
of the areas listed above to determine whether PCS was operating as a 
fiduciary in performing those services.196  With respect to claims 
processing, the court noted that other courts had held that processing 
was sufficient to prove that an entity was operating as a fiduciary,197 but 
distinguished those cases by noting that those entities also controlled the 
related cash reserves while PCS did not control the reserves and did not 
exercise discretionary authority.198  Regarding the role of the PBM in the 
establishment of the formulary, the court held that the fiduciary duty 
requirements of ERISA do not apply where the plan sponsor makes plan 
                                                 
190 214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000). 
191 Id. 
192 216 F.R.D. 307 (D.N.J. 2003) (certifying the class to pursue claims for kickbacks and 
unlawful rebates, but limited the class to participants in plans that the same PBM 
administered). 
193 Id. 
194 432 F. Supp. 2d 450 (D.N.J. 2006). 
195 Id. at 454. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 456 (citing Sixty-Five Sec. Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 583 F. Supp. 380 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Greenblatt v. Prescription Plan Servs. Corp., 783 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992)). 
198 Id. (noting that merely following the terms of the plan document does not constitute 
an exercise of discretionary authority). 
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design decisions rather than the PBM.199  Similarly, with respect to rebate 
services provided by PCS, the court stated, “PCS did not acquire 
fiduciary status or have discretionary authority over plan assets simply 
by contracting to receive its compensation for services through drug 
manufacturer rebates.”200  This role in negotiating rebates on behalf of 
the plan did not, in the court’s view, give PCS control or authority over 
plan assets.201  And with respect to the drug utilization reviews provided 
by PCS, it was the participants’ doctors who made the ultimate decisions 
regarding which drugs to prescribe.202  Based on this analysis, the court 
granted the PCS’s motion for summary judgment.203 
Additionally, in Vermont, the State Auditor wrote to the Attorney 
General requesting an investigation of Express Scripts, the PBM for state 
government employees.  She noted that Express Scripts “may be 
pocketing hidden profits averaging 43 percent from certain drug 
prescriptions.”204  The State Auditor’s office had performed sample 
testing in July of 2004 and concluded that on some drugs, Express Scripts 
was costing the state nearly $2 million per year by pocketing these 
hidden profits.205   
Further, in 2004, the U.S. government accused Medco of defrauding 
federal customers by only partially filling, switching, or even destroying 
their prescriptions.206  These practices violate the False Claims Act, which 
prohibits billing for services that were not provided.207  Medco was also 
alleged to have violated the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986208 by receiving 
payment from drug manufacturers for favoring their drugs and by 
paying a corporation to rely exclusively on Medco’s services.209  The two 
                                                 
199 Id. at 458. 
200 Id. at 459-60. 
201 Id. at 460. 
202 Id. at 461. 
203 Id. 
204 Vermont May be Paying Hidden Drug Profits: Pharmacy Benefits Manager mark up drug 
prices by as much as 111 Percent, THE GREEN MOUNTAIN EYESHADE (Office of the Vermont 
State Auditor, Montpelier, VT) (Spring 2004), at 1. 
205 Id. 
206 U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C. and Medco Health Solutions, Inc., et. al., 
Nos. Civ.A.00-737, Civ.A.99-2332 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2004); David S. Cloud, US Targets PCS 
and Merck-Medco in Investigation of Marketing Practices of Pharmaceutical Makers, WALL ST. J. 
EUR., Mar. 8, 2000, at 28, available at 2000WL-WSJE 2947415; see also James G. Sheehan, Fraud 
and Abuse in the Marketing of Ethical Pharmaceuticals Through Pharmacy Benefit Management 
Programs, 15 FOOD DRUG COSM. & MED. DEVICE L. DIG. 49, 52 (1998). 
207 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). 
208 41 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). 
209 U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
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related cases were settled in October of 2006 for $155 million.210  In 
addition to paying the fine, “the United States required that Medco enter 
into a corporate compliance agreement with the Office of Inspector 
General, Department of Health and Human Services; and with the Office 
of Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management.”211 
D. Anticompetitive and Deceptive Practices 
In Alabama, North Jackson Pharmacy, a class plaintiff, filed suit 
against Express Scripts and Medco Health Solutions, Inc., for violating 
the Sherman Act in using “anticompetitive practices” against small retail 
pharmacy operators.212  The plaintiffs alleged that the PBMs, acting as 
middlemen, forced retail pharmacies to accept unconscionable 
reimbursement rates.213  The judge denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, finding that the 
complaint provided the defendants with fair notice of the nature of the 
claims made against them.214   
E. Kickbacks 
In the Medco lawsuit filed by the U.S. government, the U.S. Attorney 
alleged that Medco was engaged both in paying and accepting payments 
in violation of anti-kickback laws.215  As noted above, Medco was 
accused of violating the Public Contracts Anti-Kickback Act216 by 
receiving payment from drug manufacturers for favoring their drugs 
and by paying a corporation to rely exclusively on Medco’s services.217   
The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services announced in December of 2006 that it had entered into 
an agreement under which Advance PCS would pay $137.4 million to 
the government “and enter into a 5-year corporate integrity agreement to 
resolve its liability for allegedly soliciting and receiving kickbacks from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and paying kickbacks to potential 
                                                 
210 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Medco to Pay U.S. $155 Million to Settle False 
Claims Act Cases (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_civ_ 
722.html. 
211 Id. 
212 North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2004). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Katz, supra note 42. 
216 41 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). 
217 Merck-Medco, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 436. 
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customers to induce them to contract with the company. This settlement 
represents the first of its kind with a PBM.”218 
V.  SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Given the pervasiveness of issues with respect to PBMs, including 
the lack of transparency, the complexity of industry audits, and the lack 
of a meaningful regulatory scheme, other solutions should be explored.  
Under a public sector approach, state agencies that contract with PBMs 
in connection with Medicare and Medicaid could insist on transparency.  
There are several private sector approaches that could assist health plans 
in assuring that the terms of their agreements with their PBMs are the 
best possible.  Under a private sector approach, groups of several large 
plans could cooperate to contract with a PBM of their choice, while 
insisting on transparency.  A single health plan or a single PBM could 
also address these issues in unique ways.  Standardized contracting has 
also been suggested as an approach to these issues with PBMs.   
As mentioned, a public sector approach would require state agencies 
that contract with PBMs to insist on transparency as part of the 
contracting process.  Jeffrey Lewis, Executive Director of the Heinz 
Family Philanthropies, has proposed this approach to achieve 
transparency and lower prices in the drug-purchasing arena and agreed 
to provide seed money to help states establish a public sector, non-profit 
PBM.219  The Heinz Family Philanthropies worked with nine states and 
the District of Columbia to create a nonprofit PBM to manage 
prescription plans.220 
The advantages and disadvantages of the Heinz approach were 
discussed in a report by Health Policy and Payer Relations,221 which 
noted:  “For manufacturers, the non-profit PBM idea has pros and cons.  
The upside is that a manufacturer will only have to negotiate with one 
                                                 
218 Office of Inspector General, OIG Reports More than $38 Billion in Savings and Recoveries 
for FY 2006, OIG NEWS at 2 (Dec. 5, 2006), http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:_LD_ 
ArikPqwJ:oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2006/PRSemiannual%2520Final%2
520FY%25202006.pdf+OIG+kickback+PBM&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1). 
219  Maine House Democrats, http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php? 
topic=housedems+news&id=1243&v=Article. 
220  Milt Freudenheim, States Organizing a Nonprofit Group to Cut Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E1DC1231F937A 
25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
221  Health Policy and Payer Relations, Issue Analysis:  Medicaid PDLs and Supplemental 
Rebate Restrictions (2003), http://www.parexelonpolicy.com/images/PAREXEL_Issue_ 
Analysis_PDLs.PDF. 
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entity, instead of nine separate states.  However, the existence of one 
entity representing nine states, including two large ones, means that 
negotiations are for higher stakes.”222  Although this approach was 
suggested in 2002, and the coalition of states was formed in early 2003, 
there has been little reported progress to date. 
The first approach would be for a single employer to form its own 
captive PBM.  This approach would require the employer to have a 
sufficient number of covered lives to interest drug manufacturers in 
negotiating directly with it.  The approach will work only where the 
employer has several million covered lives, a number not even 
approachable by Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest employer, with 1.3 
million employees in the United States.223  Unfortunately, this approach 
requires a level of expertise that far exceeds the in-house knowledge of 
executives of even the largest benefits plans in the United States.224  A 
second type of employer that might be able to use this approach is one 
that has a large number of employees in one particular area.  The 
percentage of employees associated with the employer in the particular 
area might be sufficient to move the market share in that market.   
Another approach that a single employer could take is to change the 
situs of its health plan to a state that mandates transparency.225  For 
example, a law passed by South Dakota in 2004 requires each PBM to 
“perform its duties exercising good faith and fair dealing toward the 
covered entity”226 and to “disclose to the covered entity, the amount of 
all rebate revenues and the nature, type, and amounts of all other 
revenues that the pharmacy benefits manager receives from each 
pharmaceutical manufacturer or labeler with whom the pharmacy 
benefits manager has a contract.”227  One approach to the problem is for 
health plans to transfer their situs to South Dakota or another state that 
has favorable transparency and fiduciary duty legislation.  This transfer 
                                                 
222  Id. 
223 See http://www.walmartfacts.com (“Wal-Mart employs 1.8 million associates 
worldwide, including 1.3 million in the United States.”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). 
224 Katz, supra note 42.  (“With all the criticism of pharmacy benefit managers, it’s fair to 
ask whether they’re still needed at all. Handling drug benefits in house, however, is not in 
the cards.  ‘Somebody’s got to adjudicate the claims,’ says Ron Lyon, national pharmacy 
practice leader with Towers Perrin, adding that PBMs do still provide substantial 
discounts.”). 
225 Act to Provide for the Regulation of Pharmacy Benefits Management, H.B. 1311, 79th 
Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2004). 
226 Id. at § 3. 
227 Id. at § 4. 
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would enable the plan to insist upon full disclosure under applicable 
state laws. 
Another private sector approach is for a PBM to develop a niche in 
which it markets a completely transparent plan.  Some small PBMs have 
already begun to do so.  According to the New York Times, “[s]ome 
small benefit managers have begun selling ‘transparent’ drug plans, 
promising to inform customers about all their dealings with 
manufacturers, rather than base their business on a web of complex 
rebates, discounts and incentive arrangements with drug makers.”228 
Yet another approach is for a group of plans to work together to 
form a non-profit PBM that provides complete transparency to plans.  A 
private sector approach to PBMs would require one or more private 
employers to have the capability to process prescription transactions, 
either directly or indirectly, through a third-party processor.  The private 
sector PBM would have to serve as an intermediary between the plans it 
serves, retail pharmacies, and drug manufacturers.  Perhaps the most 
daunting aspect of this would be the creation of the system to handle the 
transactions.  The most likely source for the system would be an existing 
small PBM that has already invested in the creation of a scalable system.  
That PBM could be purchased through a joint venture arrangement 
among the plans, the system could be licensed, or the plans could simply 
pay a processing fee calculated on a per-covered life or per-transaction 
basis.  Some PBMs already exist that charge solely on a per-person or 
per-transaction basis, with no other cash flow to the PBM.  One example, 
and probably the most experienced transparent PBM, is Pharmaceutical 
Technologies, Inc./National Pharmaceutical Services, which has existed 
since 1994.  Other new PBMs that have adopted the transparent model 
are Innoviant and Envision.  All are full-service PBMs that provide 
rebate contracting.  These PBMs typically provide detailed rebate 
accounting and may take a disclosed portion of the rebate (for example, 
20-30%) as service fees.   
Standardized contracting has been suggested as another way to 
address the lack of transparency in the industry.  A loose affiliation of 
health plans calling itself the Rx Collaborative is administered by Towers 
Perrin.229 Another, the Health Policy Association, is run by Hewitt 
                                                 
228 Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, More Disclosure for Drug Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 
2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E05E7D7113CF93AA25754C0A 
9659C8B63&sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=print. 
229 Katz, supra note 42.  According to a recent article: 
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Associates.230  This group originally approached manufacturers directly 
to solicit pricing net of rebates.231  More than 50 Fortune 500 companies 
in the group originally insisted on price transparency, including 
complete disclosure of all PBM revenue sources and negotiating pricing 
directly with the manufacturers.232  Yet, dispite the manufacturers’ 
general willingness to work with the plans, the administrative hurdles 
associated with this approach proved insurmountable.233   
Some large employers, members of the HR Policy Association, are 
experimenting with the idea of a group purchasing arrangement.234  
Group purchasing arrangements always carry antitrust concerns.  The 
Department of Justice has issued guidance to companies in the form of 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines235 and Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care.236  The 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines discuss monopsonies (situations where a single buyer is able 
“to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the 
                                                                                                             
[T]he Rx Collaborative pledges that members will seek financial and 
contractual protections in their drug-benefit agreements, according to a 
Towers Perrin publication. Among them are price transparency via 
“full disclosure” of PBM revenue sources; “100 percent pass-through 
of rebates, discounts, and dispensing fees”; and enough information to 
audit the PBM. 
Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Why the Plans of a Major Drug Purchasing Coalition Did Not Work, DRUG BENEFIT NEWS 
(Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.aishealth.com/DrugCosts/DBN_Drug_coalition_didn’t_work. 
html. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Davis, supra note 9.  Davis states: 
The embattled pharmacy benefit management industry could soon 
face competition from its own customers. For years, major employers 
have simply trusted PBMs . . . [b]ut some big companies have grown 
frustrated by the industry’s lack of transparency and have come to 
doubt that the professed savings are real. Thus, dozens of companies 
. . . have joined forces in an effort to directly negotiate with drug 
manufacturers for discounts on their own.  The HR Policy Association, 
which formulated the idea, calls the group “the largest private-sector 
drug purchasing coalition ever assembled.” . . . . The potential group 
buyers have surfaced at a time when drug costs are soaring and PBMs 
face intense government scrutiny for their pricing and business 
practices. 
Id. at 1. 
235 U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992). 
236 U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, at 
54 (Aug. 1996); FTC & U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors (Apr. 2000). 
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competitive price and thereby depress output.”).237  Concerns regarding 
development of monopsony power may exist if several very large 
employers were to band together to form a purchasing consortium.  To 
the extent that the group has sufficient purchasing power to affect prices 
and output within the pharmaceutical industry, we should be concerned 
that investments in innovation would decrease. 
The Department of Justice and FTC issued their joint Statements of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care in 1993.  With respect to group 
purchasing arrangements (“GPAs”), Statement 7 provides that “[m]ost 
joint purchasing arrangements among hospitals or other health care 
providers do not raise antitrust concerns.  Such collaborative activities 
typically allow the participants to achieve efficiencies that will benefit 
consumers.”238  GPAs raise antitrust concerns only where the GPA 
creates a monopsony, or power purchaser, that can exercise market 
power with respect to the product or service239 or where the GPA 
facilitates price fixing.240 
Given the choice, plan sponsors will likely focus on their core 
businesses, rather than take a hands-on role in the pharmacy benefit.241  
Sponsors need information adequate to make rational decisions about 
PBM value to create a market solution to transparency.  To assess the 
value of the PBM, a sponsor must know the true cost of the PBM service, 
obviously more than the published per-transaction (administration) fee, 
charged to the sponsor by the PBM. 
The PBM takes three cash flows in the process of administering 
prescription plans: PBMs retain a portion of the rebates (“RR”), spread 
pricing (“SP”), and the per-prescription (or per-member) administration 
fees (“ADM”). The PBM administration fees assessed are specified in the 
contract and are not subject to variation in any given contract period. We 
                                                 
237 See generally Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects 
of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615 
(2000); David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity:  Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network 
Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999). 
238 U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care at 
Statement 7 (Aug. 1996). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Plan sponsors that wish to take a more active role should be prepared to hire a cadre 
of specialists capable of auditing and overseeing the plan.  These sponsors would also have 
to contract out the processing of pharmacy claims, administration of their formulary, 
negotiating with drug manufacturers and setting up a pharmacy network. 
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can express the terms below in a mathematical expression describing 
total cost of the PBM service: 
RR + SP + ADM = Cost of the PBM service 
Experienced consultants have watched the PBM industry, under 
increasing pressure from the sponsors, give up a larger share of rebates 
to sponsors.  Therefore, PBMs have decreased the amount of rebate 
retained (“RR”) as a portion of cash flow.  In order for PBMs to meet 
quarterly Wall Street expectations, they have increased spread pricing 
(“SP”), mainly on generic drugs.  Generic drug pricing is particularly 
difficult to evaluate because generics typically have multiple prices and 
the sponsor routinely lacks adequate information on a reasonable price 
range. Complicating this system is the fact that some PBMs have several 
different MAC price lists.  The revised equation represents the current 
state of PBM cash flows (i.e., cost of PBM service): 
↓RR + ↑SP + →ADM = Cost of the PBM service 
A market solution to PBM transparency requires the sponsor to have 
sufficient knowledge to purchase PBM services rationally, with 
information on price and quality.  The following suggestions are 
intended to facilitate the sponsor’s PBM selection and monitoring, by 
positioning the plan sponsor to demand information previously 
overlooked in contract negotiations.  When a plan sponsor circulates a 
request for proposals (“RFP”) to several PBMs, the RFP should require 
the PBMs responding to it to represent that they will comply with each 
of the following items.  The sponsor might even attach to the RFP a form 
of contract and require each PBM responding to the RFP to represent 
that it will sign a contract in the form attached. 
First, the sponsor should demand that the PBM provide a copy of all 
the electronic prescription transactions performed for the sponsor in 
each billing cycle. The PBM is in the business of transmitting electronic 
transactions; it can easily remove personal information from the 
transactions and deliver the requested information to the sponsor.  PBMs 
have sometimes warned sponsors that retrieving these transactions will 
be very expensive.  This argument is untenable.  The PBM must have 
aggregated the transactions in order to bill the sponsor. The Appendix 
lists information that the plan sponsor should request. 
Second, the PBM should be required to provide the sponsor with the 
generic drug price list (“MAC”) and all subsequent updates to that MAC 
list.  This step would probably require the sponsor to sign a 
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confidentiality agreement with the PBM.  Spreads generated by the PBM 
on generic drug pricing likely represent the greatest challenge to 
sponsors in the next several years.  Having both the transactions and the 
generic price list allows the sponsor to spot-check the prices being billed.  
As stated earlier, it is quite likely that the plan sponsor will have a third 
party check the pricing in a comprehensive exam.  With the sponsor’s 
data now available, a periodic exam of the firm’s data by an outside 
vendor could prove to be a worthwhile investment. 
Third, the PBM should be required to provide the sponsor with 
accounting in adequate detail for the sponsor to confirm rebate 
payments. This information would, likely, require a confidentiality 
agreement by the sponsor.  Pharmacy transactions exist in exquisite 
detail; it is only reasonable to demand a straightforward accounting of 
the payments that the sponsor’s transactions earned.  PBMs often try to 
limit plan sponsors to auditing only transactions involving a select list of 
drugs or to auditing only transactions involving a small number of 
drugs.  The plan sponsor should insist that it or its designated auditor 
have complete access to all information needed. 
VI. Conclusion 
The PBM industry has largely escaped public scrutiny because few 
members of the public know of its existence or understand its processes.  
It is one of the most powerful industries in the health care arena today, 
yet it is ineffectively regulated by a patchwork of federal and state laws.  
The most promising areas of legislation, disclosure statutes, have been 
vehemently resisted by the PBMs.  Further, these disclosure statutes are 
far from an optimal solution, as different states pass different statutes. 
Despite the issues in this industry, the federal government does not 
appear poised to create a comprehensive regulatory scheme.  Because of 
the lack of appropriate regulation, a private sector solution appears to be 
the best solution available at this time for health plans. 
For health plans to negotiate effectively with PBMs, they must arm 
themselves with the information necessary to level the playing field.  The 
current regime of information asymmetry prevents health plans from 
negotiating the best terms possible with PBMs.  The suggestions 
provided in this article give health plan managers guidance regarding 
the tools they need to equip themselves to negotiate more effectively 
with PBMs in the future.  In the absence of these steps, PBMs will be able 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/2
2007] Leveling the PBM Playing Field 79 
to take advantage of health plan payors, resulting in higher 
pharmaceutical costs for America’s employers and plan participants. 
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APPENDIX 
Suggested data elements to request from the PBM 
NDC (National Drug Code) 
Date dispensed 
Drug name & strength 
Quantity dispensed 
Days supply 
NABP # (Pharmacy Provider ID number) 
Generic Flag (Generic/Brand identifier) 
Ingredient Cost (Amount billed to the sponsor for drug ingredient) 
Dispensing Fee (Amount paid to pharmacy for dispensing) 
Co-payment Amount (Co-payment paid by member) 
Amount Due from sponsor = (Ingredient Cost + Dispensing Fee) – 
(Co-payment) 
Reversal Flag (Reversal/Credit of transactions) 
Mail/retail pharmacy indicator 
Generic Product Indicator (GPI) 
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